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TnE search for security against spies, saboteurs, and other disaffected
persons has led to the creation of elaborate programs for the surveillance of
federal employees.' The same considerations require protective measures
among those who, nominally in private employment, produce or develop secret
weapons for the military establishment. Thus the Department of Defense
requires clearance of defense contractors and their employees before they may
have access to classified materials .2 and the Atomic Energy Commission has
a statutory mandate to investigate the "character, associations, and loyalty,"
of those to whom it entrusts "restricted data."3 But neither of these martial
agencies exercises as much sway over the livelihood of private citizens as
does the United States Coast Guard. Better known for its unceasing attention
to wrecks, buoys, and icebergs,4 since the Korean War the Coast Guard has
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1. For a thorough treatment of the program for federal employees, see Bo:-rcou,
THE FEDEmAL LoYALTr-Szcuiury PROGRAM (1953). Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 FE. RZG.
2489 (1953), made "security" rather than "lyalty" the controlling standard throughout
the executive branch.
2. See ,UNITIONS BOARD, INDUsTRIAL SECUmTy MANUAL FoR SAFECUADING CrAssi-
Flm SEcuRiTY INFORMATION (Dep't Def. 1951); MumrTio-,s BOARD, How To BE CMtnErI
FOR HANDLING CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION WITHIN INDUSTRY (Dep't Def. 1951).
The appeal mechanism described in these documents was abolished as of April 1, 1953
by order of Sec'y of Defense Wilson, but a directive of 'May 4, 1953 replaced it with
something quite similar. Secretaries of War, Navy, and Air Force, Industrial Personnel
and Facility Security Clearance Program (mimeo.).
3. Atomic Energy Act, 60 STAT. 767 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1810(b) (5) (B) (ii) (1946).
See generally, Gru. OmR, SEcuRITY, Loy.Lry & ScmrEcE (1950).
4. See, e.g., BAARSLAG, COAST GUARD To TnE REscuE (1937).
HeinOnline -- 62 Yale L.J. 1163 1952-1953
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
been charged with weeding out security risks from among seamen and water-
front workers. More than half a million Americans have met the test.6 What
is striking is that the seemingly small number found wanting-some 2,500 0-
is probably greater than the toll of victims of any other loyalty or security
program. 7 Also striking is the lack of public attention that this aspect of the
Port Security Program,8 as it is called, has attracted. This inattention be-
comes truly remarkable in view of the Program's impact: denial of clearance
to a seaman bars him altogether from practicing his calling. In this respect
the Port Security Program is unique; for though other federal security pro-
grams affecting private employment may have the practical effect of excluding
a man from his vocation, no other one purports to do so ;9 they are framed
in terms of access to classified matter, and the world of unclassified employ-
ment is presumably still open to the reject.' 0
5. See p. 1185 infra.
6. See note 119 infra.
7. Of the 25,566 investigations that reached loyalty boards in the five years the
Federal Employee Loyalty Program was in operation, 519 persons were finally dismissed
or denied employment. LOYALTY REviEw BOARD, REPORT ON THE LOYALTY PROGRAM AS
OF MARCH 1953 (U.S. Civil Ser. Comm. 1953). A statement on the AEC Program for itq
more than five years of operation, believed to be forthcoming in 14 SEMIANN. REr. AEC
(1953), will report a similar number of denials of clearance. Complete figures onl separa-
tions under Pub. L. No. 733, 64 STAT. 476, 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (Supp. 1952), the 1950 statute
permitting removal on security grounds from a number of agencies, are unavailable.
Under prior security legislation, applicable chiefly to the Dep't of Defense and its com-
ponents, 56 STAT. 1053 (1942), 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1946), the total number removed from
1942 to 1950 was 375. Hearings before House Committee on Postoffice and Civil Senice
on HR. 7439 (Pub. L. 733), 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1950). See also BoNrEcou, op. di.
supra note 1, at 145.
8. This article is limited to consideration of personnel screening measures under the
Port Security Program. The program has other important aspects, including supervision
of explosives handling, the guarding of restricted areas and general security supervision
of waterfront areas, and the search of ships coming into American waters for atomic
weapons or other explosives. For a review of the Coast Guard's work on these other
aspects see N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1953, p. 45, col. 6.
9. Other federal security measures affecting private employment are collected in
Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 954, n.95 (1953). A federal loyalty program affects employment
of Americans by the Secretariat of the United Nations. See Exec. Order No. 10422 18
FED. REa. 239 (1953), as amended, Exec. Order No. 10459, 18 FED. REG. 3183 (1953)
SEC'Y-GEN'L, REPORT ON PERSONNEL PoLicv A/2364 (1953).
10. See sources cited in notes 2, 3 supra. But if the nature of a person's vocation
is such that the Government and its contractors are the only likely employers, as, for
example, with an atomic weapons expert, denial of security clearance may have the
practical effect of excluding a man from this vocation. See GELLHORN, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 111, passim.
"Classified" material or information refers chiefly to "security information" designated
"Restricted," "Confidential," "Secret," or "Top Secret," in accordance with Exec. Order
No. 10290, 16 FE. REG. 9795 (1951), and to "restricted data" under the Atomic Energy
Act. Cf. the proposed Executive Order released June 17, 1953.
[Vol. 62:11631164
HeinOnline -- 62 Yale L.J. 1164 1952-1953
SECURITY TESTS
The risk of exclusion that the seaman faces today may reach other occupa-
tions tomorrow. The Port Security Program itself rests more lightly on other
waterfront workers than on seafarers. A longshoreman (or a shipping com-
pany officer or a racketeer) needs a Port Security Card only if his business
takes him to docks where cargo of a military nature is being handled. But
if the Commandant of the Coast Guard so decides and by regulation so pre-
scribes, the whole waterfront may be closed." Similarly, the confinement of
Defense Department screening to private employees on highly classified con-
tracts is, as things stand, largely a matter of forbearance. An apprehensive
Secretary might decree that all employees of all contractors must be above
suspicion, unless some restrictions are imposed by the courts or by Congress.
And congressional scrutiny of executive action is likely to be expansive
rather than restrictive in its results when the national security is invoked.
As will appear, the sweeping Port Security Program rests on almost off-
hand legislative response to the Korean War." Another crisis might direct
anxious official attention to power plants, or steel mills, or railroads, or any
number of other vital industries.
Consequently, a close look at the Port Security Program has relevance
beyond the circumstances that involved the Coast Guard in communist-hunt-
ing. The legal issues--the power of the Government to deny private employ-
ment, the authorization of the Coast Guard to undertake this program, the
adequacy of the standards and procedures it employs-may, if they are con-
firmed by usage or by judicial approbation, affect the lives of many who are
not poor seamen.
Communism and the Shipping Industry
If the state of the world makes sabotage and espionage real dangers, the
shipping industry is undoubtedly vulnerable. Ships and docks are bottle-
necks through which pass most military equipment bound overseas; and both
are acutely flammable types of structures. The accidental catastrophe at Texas
City in 1947 13 now makes insignificant the Black Tom explosion on the Jersey
City waterfront in 1916; but at the time Black Tom was a spectacular feat of
sabotage.14 The same rings of German agents who perpetrated the Black
Tom explosion were for a while equally successful in planting incendiary
bombs in ships' cargoes so that they would catch fire at sea; 13 their dupes
were said to be dock workers with pro-German or anti-British sympathies. 10
Moreover, seamen, with their overseas contacts, are particularly useful as
11. See p. 1173 infra.
12. See p. 1187 infra.
13. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1947, p. 1, cols. 4-8. See In re Texas City Diaster
Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952).
14. See ,VzYL, THE BAT=nE AGAxST DISLOYALTY 115 ct seq. (1951).
15. WEY'L, op. cit. mtpra note 14, at 102 et seq. See also the account of German
attempts to tie up New York Port by subsidizing strikes of dock workers. Id. at 103.
16. Id. at 104.
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spies or couriers for spies. There was a lively traffic in such shady characters
during the early years of both World Wars.' 7
No significant episodes are reported after our entry into World War II. 18
By that time our security apparatus, and our procedures for the detention of
dangerous enemy aliens, were much better organized.L Part of that apparatus
was a program, then as now administered by the Coast Guard, for limiting
access to waterfront installations ;20 but so little has been disclosed about its
operation that it is not feasible to apportion the credit for our immunity
from sabotage. The methods used combined blanket surveillance of property
and personnel by the Coast Guard with pinpoint apprehension of known
saboteurs by the FBI.
The outbreak of the Korean War created a situation not unlike that in the
two World Wars before America became a belligerent. We were not fully at
war, with all the restrictions on movement and the sealing of boundaries that
then follow; yet we were very decidedly the arsenal of democracy, and it was
now to the interests of international communism by political strikes and other
devices to cripple our supply lines to Asia and our rearming of western
Europe.21 just as the Germans had friendly contacts with compatriots here
who had no love for the Allied cause, so communism had its American sym-
pathizers.
Nowhere had they infiltrated more deeply than in some sectors of maritime
labor. The miserable conditions of life at sea, and the scarcely better lot of
longshoremen, provided in the 1930's a fertile soil for militant communism,
and for militant unions. 22 The unions faced a chronic oversupply of labor,
accentuated by foreign competition with the weak shipping industry.23 But in
the last two decades, while the Government supported them with the Wagner
Act 24 and the shipowners with subsidies, 23 the unions have made great gains
17. Id. at 98 et seq., 153 et seq.
18. In November, 1947, J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, said: "[T]his nation
came through the war with no enemy-directed acts of sabotage. The enemy espionage
efforts were thwarted. . . ." N.Y. Herald Tribune, Nov. 16, 1947, p. 45, col. 3.
19. See WEYL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 173 et seq.; Brecht, The Concentration Camp,
50 Cor. L. REv. 761, 766 (1950) ; Note, Intermal Security Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. REv.
606, 653 (1951).
20. See notes 44 and 127 infra.
21. See, e.g., accounts of the efforts of the French Communist Party to interfere
with shipments of war materials to Europe. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1950, p. 16, col. 2;
id., Feb. 20, 1950, p. 24, col. 2; id., Feb. 24, 1950, p. 12, col. 3.
22. See, e.g., EDIroas OF FORTUNE, OUR SHIPS 373 et seq. (1938) (reprinted from
Fortune, Sept., 1937).
23. Id. at 307 et seq.
24. National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C § 157 el seq.
(1946).
25. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 STAr. 198 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1151 el seq.
(1946). On the scope of these subsidies see FED. MARITimE BoaRD ANN. RE'. 12 ct seq.
(1952).
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for their members.26 Much of the militancy meanwhile was expended on intern-
al and inter-union strife.2 7 It was not of a particularly gentle sort, either.
Sailors, if they needed instruction in strongarm methods, had long been ex-
posed to it by their masters.
Under these circumstances, many of the contests within and between unions
involved pro- and anti-communist alignments. As elsewhere in the labor
movement, the AFL-CIO division had some correlation with communist in-
fluence, though the plethora of unions in the industry may result from routine
rivalry as well as from political schisms.2  Without attempting to unravel
all the strands, it does appear that three unions-the National" Maritime Union
(deckhands), the Marine Cooks and Stewards, and the International Long-
shoremen's and Varehousemen's Union-have been communist-dominated.
Before Korea the NIU, headed by Joseph Curran, turned to an anti-com-
munist position ;29 it is still in the CIO. The other two, led by Hugh Bryson -
(ICS) and Harry Bridges 31 (ILWU), were expelled from the CIO when
the CIO purged itself of allegedly communist-controlled unions in 1950.Y
This action did not materially weaken the strong leadership of either Bryson
or Bridges,a although a CIO splinter (Pacific Marine Stewards broke off
26. See Daykin, The Status of the 3Maritinte W~orhcrs Undcr the National Labor
Relations Act, 26 ORE. L. REv. 229 (1947). Compare the wage scale of maritime personnel
in the year 1940, LA-r, WHAT EVERY Crrxzmz SHOULD Kzow ABOUT TH1- "MNICHAN
MAR.NE 108 et seq. (1941), uith current wages, DAVENPORT SEAMAz SERVI, M1FPCHA NT
MAn.NE ExROLL-"NT AND CAREER GumE 4 (1953) (ordinary seamen have risen from
a minimum wage of $55 per month to $232.92; firemen from $72.50 to 1259.55).
27. See, e.g., Wollett & Lampman, The Law of Union Factionalsm--Tle Case of
the Sailors, 4 STAN. L. Rv. 177 (1952).
28. On the organization of maritime labor see, generally, Sm-TH, LAron LAw 54
et seq. (1950) ; PEERso.N, HA- DooK oF LABOR Uxious (1944).
29. See BoVEn, THE DARK SHIP (1947) ; Neikind, Joe Curran: Scama-; in Deep
Water, The Reporter, March 22, 1950, p. 27.
30. Bryson recently received the dubious distinction of being the first leader of a
national or international union to be indicted on charges of perjury in falsely stating that
he was not a communist in a non-communist affidavit required by the Taft-Hartley Act
New Haven Evening Register, Apr. 18, 1953, p. 21, col. 2. The membership of the MCS,
about 5,000, is only about one-tenth that of either the NMU or the IL U. See generally
STAFF REPORT TO THE SUvcomrITIn= ON LABOR Aim LABOR-MAzNAGEm;T RELATIOS
or THE SENATE CommITTE oN4 LABOR AND Puruc WE=rARE, TH MnL~a: Ccorss Alm
STEWARws UNION (82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1953).
31. Bridges' long battle against deportation recently culminated in the reversal of his
conviction for conspiring to secure his naturalization by fraudulently representing that he
had never belonged to the Communist Party, Bridges v. United States, 21 U.S.L NV-
4457 (U.S. June 15, 1953).
32. See SEx. Doc. No. 39, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 79 (1951).
33. See Hield, What Keeps Harry Bridges Going, Labor and Nation, Jan., 1952,
p. 38. But see the recent report that Bridges might be planning to organize the Marine
Cooks and Stewards into a local of the ILWU to counteract the organizing drive of the
Seafarers' Int'l Union against the MCS. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1953, p. 63, col. 2.
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from the MCS, and three important anti-communist locals remained in the
ILWU.
This brief account of a stormy history is significant for two reasons. It
lends support to those who argue that the industry contains many communists,
not of an ineffectual intellectual type. And it helps to explain the absence of
widespread union opposition to the Port Security Program. Most unions
were already belligerently anti-communist, either on principle or as a tactic
against rival unions. Sometimes (as in the case of the NMU) this position
was held with the extra zeal of the recent convert. When one superimposes
on security considerations the attraction of ridding the industry of communist
elements, it becomes understandable that the unions and the employers should
now join in support of the Security Program.
Though no one would accuse the management groups of communist sym-
pathies, there have been charges that they found advantageous and even
encouraged the divisions among labor on the communist issue.34 Indeed, the
employers doubtless have profited from this strife to the extent that it dis-
sipated the energies of union leaders. However, the inconvenience of dealing
with competing unions, with the risk of work stoppages in which employers
are helpless, must check somewhat employers' satisfaction over labor's squab-
bles, as well as any impulse to foment them. In any case, such employers'
associations as the Pacific Maritime Association, the New York Shipping
Association, and the National Association of Stevedores have actively sup-
ported the Port Security Program. 5
The Coast Guard's Role in the Voluntary Security Program
Although the Coast Guard traditionally has been close to the maritime
industry because of its responsibility for marine safety, it did not acquire
supervisory control over the licensing and certifying of merchant marine
personnel until 1942. The Coast Guard inherited these powers from the
Bureau of Marine Inspection and its predecessor bureaus in the Department
of Commerce which for more than half a century had handled these func-
tions.3 6 The controls include the issue of licenses and certificates to appli-
cants upon their satisfying prescribed standards of suitability, experience, and
ability,3 7 and investigation of acts of incompetence or misconduct, with au-
34. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT, op. cit. supra note 30, at 131-2.
35. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 25, 1950, p. 51, col. 2.
36. An Act of 1884, 23 STAT. 118, 46 U.S.C. § 1 (1928), created a Bureau of Navi-
gation in the Dep't of Commerce. In 1932 this Bureau was consolidated with the Steam-
boat Inspection Service and in 1936 its name was changed to the Bureau of Marine In-
spection and Navigation. 49 STAT. 1380, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1952). Tem-
porary transfer of the functions of this Bureau to the Coast Guard was made by Exec.
Order No. 9083, 7 FED. REG. 1609 (1942). This transfer was made permanent by 1946
Reorg. Plan No. 3, 11 FED. RcG. 7875, 60 STAT. 1097, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § I (Supp.
1952).
37. See, e.g., 62 STAT. 233 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 229c (Supp. 1952): "Whenever
any person applies for authority to perform the duties of radiotelegraph operator of any
1168 (Vol. 62:1163
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thority to revoke or suspend licenses or certificates in proper casesPs With-
out a license or certificate a man is not eligible for employment in the marine
trades.3 9 There was considerable opposition on the part of the maritime
unions to the original transfer of these functions to the Coast Guard and this
antagonism toward the Coast Guard has not altogether abated.4 0
The Coast Guard had another source of power. Since 1917 a federal statute
has authorized the granting to the Coast Guard of broad powers over port
facilities, vessels, and their personnel during periods of national emergency.41
This statute was invoked by presidential proclamation in 1917 4 and again
in 1940 ;43 during World War II it was relied upon as authority for sweeping
vessel, the inspectors shall require possession of a valid first- or second-class radiotelegraph
operator license issued by the Federal Communications Commission; and if, upon full
consideration, they are satisfied that his character, habits of life, and physical condition
are such as to authorize the belief that he is a suitable and safe person to be entrusted
with the powers and duties of such a station, they shall grant him a license... :' See
also 49 STAT. 1930 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 672 (Supp. 1952) (seamen); 30 STAT.
764 (1893), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 226 (Supp. 1952) (captains) ; 30 STAT. 340 (1893),
as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 228 (Supp. 1952) (mates) ; 29 STAT. 189 (1S96), as amended,
46 U.S.C. § 229 (Supp. 1952) (engineers). These requirements are collected and sum-
marized in BuEAu OF LABOR STATISTIcs, Bun. No. 1054: EmPLOYmET Oumeorn m~
THE MERCHANT AfAmNE 26 et seq. (1951). Cf. Gove, Sayre & Lazar v. Farley, Ciil
Nos. 4596-49, D.D.C., 1949, holding that the due process clause was not violated by Com-
mandant's determination that applicants for radio operator's licenses were not "suitable
and safe" persons because of their affiliation with the Communist Party. An appeal from
the oral opinion was dropped.
38. 49 STAT. 1380 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 239 (Supp. 1952); 46 Coon FED.
IEGs. c. 1 (1949) ; In re Merchant Mariners Documents Issued to Dimitratos, 91 F. Supp.
426 (N.D. Calif. 1949).
39. 30 STAT. 764 (1898), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §224 (Supp. 1952) ; 53 STAT. 1196
(1939), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 246 (Supp. 1952) ; 38 STAT. 1169 (1915), as amended,
46 U.S.C. § 672(i) (1946).
40. See, e.g., the statements of officials of the Seafarers' Int'l Union, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 24, 1950, p. 106, col. 5.
41. 40 STAT. 220 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 191 (Supp. 1952). This statute
provides that:
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the
President, rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement
of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United
States, may inspect such vessel at any time, place guards thereon, and, if
necessary in his opinion in order to secure such vessels from damage or in-
jury, or to prevent damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United
States, or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United
States, may take, by and with the consent of the President, for such pur-
poses, full possession and control of such vessel and remove therefrom the
officers and crew thereof and all other persons not specially authorized by
him to go or remain on board thereof.
42. The Proclamation was issued by the President on Dec. 3, 1917. 50 U.S.C. § 191
note (Supp. 1952).
43. Proclamation No. 2412, 5 FE. REG. 2419 (1940).
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security measures at the nation's ports. 44 These measures were abandoned
upon the termination of hostilities in 1945 and the authority was revoked
in 1947.4 5
There was thus in being no legal authority for port security measures when
South Korea was invaded by the communists in June, 1950. And until the
declaration of a national emergency, the 1917 statute could not be invoked.
Consequently, on July 22nd the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce with the
approval of President Truman issued an invitation to leading shipowners and
maritime union leaders to confer two days later on "questions of national
security," specifically on ways of preventing communists from remaining active
in the American merchant marine.40  Representatives of all invited major
maritime unions, of the various maritime associations and steamship com-
panies, and of the interested Government agencies attended the conference in
Washington. A voluntary plan to weed out communists from the merchant
marine during the Korean emergency was agreed upon. Neither Harry
Bridges' ILWU nor Hugh Bryson's Marine Cooks and Stewards had been
invited to this conference, but representatives of the three anti-communist
locals 47 of the ILWU nevertheless attended and signed the agreement. The
core of the agreement was an undertaking by the Coast Guard to determine,
on the basis of information furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Office of Naval Intelligence, what persons in the merchant marine
were poor security risks. All the parties then agreed, quite without legal
authority, to deny such persons the right to sail. The resolution provided, in
occasionally picturesque language:
"We, the representatives of Maritime Labor, and employer organi-
zations in the Maritime industry, in the current crisis caused by the
Communist invasion of Southern Korea, hereby declare ourselves
bound by the following policy:
"(1) We pledge full cooperation to the United States Govern-
ment in the entire period of the emergency.
"(2) We recognize that certain men, because of being known
as Communist Party card carriers, subversives, or who are no-
torious as consistently carrying out policies of the Communist
Party, will be classified as bad security risks by the military or
proper Government authorities.
"(3) No ship will be delayed because any such men are re-
44. See Exec. Order No. 9074, 7 FED. REG. 1587 (1942); Directives, Commandant
of the Coast Guard (April 15 and July 20, 1942).
45. Presidential Proclamation No. 2732, 12 FED. REG. 3583 (1947), revoked Proc-
lamation No. 2412, note 43 supra. A Joint Resolution, 61 STAT. 451 (1947), provided
that, in the interpretation of the Act of 1917, July 25, 1947, would be deemed the date of
termination of any state of war theretofore declared by Congress and of the national
emergencies proclaimed by the President in 1939 and 1941.
46. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1950, § V, p. 7, col. 1.
47. Local 10, Local 19, and Local 34.
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jected by the United States military or proper Government au-
thorities as a bad security risk.
"(4) If such a man is thus rejected, the Union involved
immediately will furnish a replacement. However, the Union
or the employee involved, shall have the right to appeal the case
before a proper review board, if it feels the classification of any
individual is improper or incorrect.
"(5) No man shall be classified as a bad security risk as a
means of discrimination because of union activity.
"(6) In any review board set up to review such appeals
organized labor and management shall have proper representa-
tion as follows: In each principal port one man shall represent
the employers, one man shall represent the union, and one man
from the Coast Guard. A National appeals board shall be set
up in Washington, D.C., comprised of representatives from each
group in a similar representation.
"(7) Should any union or organization not here signatory
by phony demonstrations, bogus picket lines. etc., endeavor to
delay or obstruct vessel movements, all unions signatory shall
not assist, condone, or support such movements but shall keep
the vessels sailing. "4S
The Coast Guard immediately began screening merchant marine personnel
on the West Coast and by August was also screening seamen on foreign-
bound voyages of American merchant vessels from East and Gulf Coast
ports.4 9 The rough procedure adopted was for the Coast Guard Shipping
Commissioner in each port to go aboard a ship and check the name of any
person desiring to sign on against a secret list in his possession. Anyone whose
name appeared on the list was declared to be a poor security risk; under the
agreement management refused to allow him to sign on; the appropriate union
sent a replacement from its hiring hall. The tripartite appeal boards called
for by the agreement were never established under the voluntary program,
but there was an informal interim procedure of appeal to a designated Coast
Guard officer in each port and from him to a five-officer board in Washington.
In addition, any reject who considered himself improperly screened was
encouraged to forward his complaint directly to the Commandant in Wash-
ington. The Coast Guard blamed its tardiness in setting up the tripartite
boards on the necessity of having all management and the union nominees to
the boards fully investigated by the FBIV?
48. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1950, p. 51, cols. 2, 3.
49. Two independent screening programs for longshoremen were also initiated in
1950. In Boston the NMU set up its own screening procedure. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22,
1950, p. 51, col. 2. The Army and Navy set up a joint program for screening workers at
San Francisco Military Port facilities. Id. Sept. 1, 1950, p. 41, col. 6; id. Sept. 6, 1950,
p. 59, col. S.
50. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1950, p. 55, col. 1.
Temporary boards consisting of one Coast Guard officer were continued under the
statutory program for several months until tripartite board members were cleared. See
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THE STATUTORY PROGRAM
Even before the voluntary program was adopted, Senator Magnuson of
Washington, at the request of the Department of Justice, introduced a bill
to amend the Act of 1917. This measure, 51 hurriedly passed by both houses
and signed by the President on August 9, 1950, is entitled "An Act to au-
thorize the President to control the anchorage and movement of foreign-flag
vessels in waters of the United States when the security of the United States
is endangered, and for other purposes." Its text is as follows:
"Whenever the President finds that the security of the United
States is endangered by reason of actual or threatened war, or in-
vasion, or insurrection, or subversive activity, or of disturbances or
threatened disturbances of the international relations of the United
States, the President is authorized to institute such measures and
issue such rules and regulations
"(a) to govern the anchorage and movement of any foreign-flag
vessels in the territorial waters of the United States, to inspect such
vessels at any time, to place guards thereon, and if necessary in his
opinion in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or
to prevent damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United
States, or to secure the observance of rights and obligations of the
United States, may take for such purposes full possession and control
of such vessels and remove therefrom the officers and crew thereof,
and all other persons not especially authorized by him to go or remain
on board thereof;
"(b) to safeguard against destruction, loss, or injury from sabo-
tage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of similar
nature, vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities in the United
States, the Canal Zone, and all territory and water, continental or
insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... .
On October 18, 1950, President Truman, under the authority granted him
by the Magnuson Act, issued Executive Order 10173 entitled "Regulations
Relating to the Safeguarding of Vessels, Harbors, Ports and Waterfront
Facilities of the United States."' ' 3 This order gave the Coast Guard extensive
controls over all vessels entering or leaving United States waters and over
all maritime personnel. It thus not only superseded the voluntary program
for the seagoing trades, but included in the screening program waterfront
employees as well. The Executive Order also made a penal provision of the
Act of 1917 applicable to the new program.54 Early in November the Corn-
introduction to regulations, 15 FED. REG. 9327 (1950), p. 1173 infra. But anyone rejected
by a one-man board was subsequently allowed to have his case reviewed by a tripartite
board as soon as one was constituted in his district. Affidavit of Vice-Admiral Merlin
O'Neill, dated Oct., 1951, filed in Parker v. Lester,--F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953),
p. 22.
51. 64 STAT. 427 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 191 (Supp. 1952).
52. Ibid.
53. 15 FED. REG. 7005 (1950). The President based the order on a finding that the
security of the United States was endangered by reason of subversive activity.
54. The penal provisions provide for seizure and forfeiture of a vessel, fine and im-
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mandant of the Coast Guard issued proposed regulations implementing the
Executive Order, announced a hearing, and invited comments.G On December
27, 1950, after hearing the views of varied parties including the Maritime
Committee of the CIO, the American Civil Liberties Union, Harry Bridges,
and Hugh Bryson, the Commandant issued and made official the proposed
regulations with a few of the modifications proposed by the ACLU.50
The Commandant has gradually expanded the scope of the Port Security
Program, by exercising his power to designate areas of the waterfront and
categories of vessels subject to the Program. The Executive Order requires
the Commandant to designate affirmatively waterfront facilities that are to be
restricted,57 but it provides that all United States merchant vessels are re-
stricted, subject to the power of the Commandant to create exempt cate-
gories.5s
Because of limited manpower, the Coast Guard first concentrated on the
crews of ships in foreign trade, and initiated only a limited waterfront pro-
gram. But the Commandant has gradually extended the categories of re-
stricted vessels, so that the Program now covers practically all shipping, '9
even barges on the Great Lakes and the western rivers.0 0 The number of
waterfront areas declared restricted has also gradually increased.6 '
prisonment of an individual. 40 STAT. 220 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 192 (Supp.
1952).
55. 15 FED. REG. 7527 (1950).
56. 15 id. 9327 (1950).
57. Exec. Order No. 10173, § 6.10-5, 15 FED. REo. 7005 (1950).
58. Id. § 6.10-1. As of March 1, 1953, there were 1,263 privately owned ocean-going
vessels of over 1000 gross tons flying the American flag. In addition, 155 Government-
owned vessels were being operated by private companies for the Government. 8-,538
licensed and certified men were employed on these vessels. NATIONAL FEDMATION OF
AumcAN SHIPPING, REsEARcH REPoirs Nos. 53-3, 53-4 (1953).
American shipowners avoid many forms of Government control and are able to
pay wages far below those set by American unions by sailing under foreign flags. From
1939 to 1951 over 738 privately-owned vessels were transferred to foreign registry. See
Ass'N OF A.ER=CAN SHIP OwNERs, SHIPPING SURVEY 1 (March 1952). Port Security
screening does not apply to their crews. However, these foreign-flag vessels are subject
to other security measures. See p. 1172 supra. Some seamen denied security clear-
ance by the Coast Guard have apparently found employment on foreign vessels. Com-
munication to the YALE LAw JouPNAr. from Thomas Ray, Director of Research, NMU,
dated May 6, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
59. See § 121.02 16 FED. REG. 817 (1951); § 121.16, 16 id. 6180 (1951), amended by
16 id. 6363 (1951), 16 id. 846 (1951), 17 id. 65S (1952), 17 id. 5040 (1952). These
Regulations now apply to all merchant vessels of the United States of 100 gross tons and
upward engaged in foreign, intercoastal, coastvise, and Great Lakes trade.
60. § 125.37, 16 id. 8273 (1951). The Coast Guard recently announced that after
July 1, 1953, crew members of harbor craft on the Great Lakes would be required to carry
identification,.credentials. New Haven Sunday Register, April 26, 1953, p. 4, col. 2. Since
these men were not previously licensed by the Coast Guard they are screened under the
waterfront program and issued Port Security Cards rather than validated documents.
61. According to latest reports, 24 piers are now restricted at the New York Port.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1953, p. 45, col. 6.
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The Initial Screening Process
The administrative keystone of the security program is the provision in the
Executive Order that any person employed on any vessel of United States
registration or seeking access to any vessel or waterfront facility within the
jurisdiction of the United States may be required to carry identification
credentials issued by or otherwise satisfactory to the Commandant of the
Coast Guard.62 Under this authority the Commandant adopted separate but
similar procedures for the seagoing trades and waterfront employees. Since
seagoing personnel already are required to hold a federal license or certificate,
the regulations provide a method for stamping these Merchant Marine Docu-
ments "validated for emergency service" when security clearance has been
granted. 63 The normal validation procedure requires the seaman to apply in
the prescribed manner at any Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office. The
Office will forward the application to the Commandant in Washington,
where it is checked against the files to see if they disclose derogatory infor-
mation about the applicant. The files contain reports from the various investi-
gative agencies of the Government, such as the FBI and the intelligence
branches of the armed forces. The Coast Guard does not employ its own
investigators in this program and does not attempt to verify the derogatory
information or any evaluation that may be placed on it by the reporting
agencies. On the basis of this processing, the Commandant decides whether
security clearance will be granted. 64 The office of application is then notified
of the Commandant's decision, and either prepares validated documents for
the applicant or a form letter of rejection; these are generally held in that
office until picked up by the applicant.6"
While awaiting clearance, which usually takes about six weeks, the appli-
cant may not sail in any restricted ship unless he can get a "trip letter" from
the local Coast Guard Office.66 Validated documents or a trip letter are the
only acceptable credentials for employment on restricted vessels. 7
Because longshoremen and other waterfront workers do not have to hold
licenses, a slightly different procedure was adopted for them. The Comman-
dant has prescribed certain identification credentials that are considered ac-
ceptable for entry into restricted port areas; among them are validated Mer-
62. Exec. Order No. 10173, §6.10-5, 15 FEI. REG. 7005 (1950).
63. 33 CODE FED. REGs. § 121.15 (Supp. 1952).
64. 33 id. § 12 1.13(c).
65. 33 id. § 121.13 (b) (4).
66. 33 id. § 121.07 provides that security clearance "may be given in the form of per-
mission for employment for one voyage, or for a specific length of time, or by the issu-
ance of a document bearing evidence of security clearance." The trip letter procedure
is based on this provision. This letter is good for only one trip on one vessel mid is
generally not issued unless the applicant already has an assured job and theie is a short-
age in his rating.
67. 33 id. § 121.11.
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chant Mk'arine Documents and the Armed Forces Identification Card.c9 Persons
not holding such credentials who are regularly employed at waterfront facil-
ities or who have regular public or private business at such facilities may
apply for a Coast Guard Port Security Card.G9 The processing of this appli-
cation is similar to that of the Merchant Marine Documents, but there is no
general provision for the issuance of temporary passes pending clearance. °
Criteria for Denial of Clearance
Executive Order 10173 -as amended in August, 1951, to provide that
clearance will be denied "unless the Commandant is satisfied that the character
and habits of life of the applicant therefor are such as to authorize the belief
that the presence of such individual on board a vessel or within a waterfront
facility would not be inimical to the security of the United States." 7' The
form in which this standard is cast seems to impose on the Commandant a
responsibility to make an affirmative decision that the applicant is reliable.
No overt change in policy, however, accompanied the adoption of this formula
in place of the original one, which required a denial if the Commandant found
that the employment would be inimical to security. 72 If the present form has
any significance, it presumably implies that doubts are to be resolved against
the applicant.
The Commandant's Regulations provide that in making the required deter-
mination he may consider whether, on all the evidence and information avail-
able, "reasonable grounds" exist for the belief that the individual:
"(1) Has committed acts of treason or sedition, or has engaged
in acts of espionage or sabotage; has actively advocated or aided the
commission of such acts by others; or has knowingly associated with
persons committing such acts; or,
68. Ibid. Other credentials deemed satisfactory by the Commandant are identification
credentials issued by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies to their officers
and employees, and credentials issued to public safety officials (e.g., police and firemen)
when acting within the scope of their employment.
69. 33 id. § 125.15. A sponsor is required to certify that the applicant is employed in
work connected with the waterfront or is a member of a maritime union, and that the
applicant's statements on his application are true to the best of the sponsor's Imowledge.
33 id. §§ 125.19, 125.25.
70. 33 id. § 125.37, relating to requirement of credentials on barges on the Great L!:es
and western rivers, was amended to allow issuance of temporary letters of clearance at
the discretion of District Commanders if applicant has applied for a Port Security Card
and his service is necessary to avoid delay in the sailing of the vessel. 17 FmD. Rn-. 2503
(1952).
71. Exec. Order No. 10173, § 6.10-1, 15 FED. REG. 7005 (1950), as amended, Exec.
Order No. 10277, 16 FED. RE. 7537 (1951), provided that "no licensed officer or certifi-
cated man" shall be employed on a vessel unless cleared. This provision was once again
amended by Exec. Order No. 10352, 17 FED. RE. 4607 (1952), to provide that "no person"
shall be employed on a vessel unless cleared.
72. Exec. Order No. 10173, § 6.10-1, 15 FED. REG. 7005 (1950).
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"(2) Is employed by, or subject to the influence of, a foreign
government under circumstances which may jeopardize the security
interests of the United States; or,
"(3) Has actively advocated or supported the overthrow of the
government of the United States by the use of force or violence; or,
"(4) Has intentionally disclosed military information classified
confidential or higher without authority and with reasonable knowl-
edge or belief that it may be transmitted to a foreign government,
or has intentionally disclosed such information to persons not au-
thorized to receive it; or,
"(5) Is or recently has been a member of, or affiliated, or sym-
pathetically associated with, any foreign or domestic organization,
association, movement, group, or combination of persons (i) which
is, or which has been designated by the Attorney General as being
totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, (ii) which has adopted,
or which has been designated by the Attorney General as having
adopted, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts
of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Con-
stitution of the United States, or (iii) which seeks, or which has
been designated by the Attorney General as seeking, to alter the form
of the Government of the United States by unconstitutional means:
Provided, That access may be granted, notwithstanding such mem-
bership, affiliation, or association, if it is demonstrated, by more than
a mere denial, that the security interests of the United States will not
thereby be jeopardized."73
These criteria will be recognized as essentially those of the Federal Em-
ployees Loyalty Program; 74 they recur, with modifications and embellish-
ments, in other loyalty and security programs.7 For waterfront employees
the Coast Guard Regulations include additional criteria which are already part
of the normal licensing standards for seamen.70 They refer to non-political
disqualifications like insanity, drunkenness on the job, narcotics addiction, and
illegal presence in the United States.7 It may be worth noting that the
apparent harshness of the standard in the Executive Order is somewhat
mitigated by the reference to "reasonable grounds" in the Regulations. This
echoes the original wording used in the Federal Employees Loyalty Program,
73. 33 CODE FED REGs. § 121.13(d) (Supp. 1952).
74. Exec. Order No. 9835, pt. V, 12 FrD. REG. 1935, 1938 (1947).
75. See, e.g., DE,'T OF THE ARMy, SPECIAL REGULATIONS 620-220-1, 380-160-2 (1950);
1 DEP'T OF STATE, MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEURES 390 (1951); MuNiTIONs
BOARD, CRITERIA GOVERNING ACrIONS BY THE INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT REviEW BOARD
(Dep't Def. 1950).
76. See note 37 supra.
77. 33 CODE FED. REis. § 125.29 (f) (Supp. 1952). See also 33 id. § 125.30, added
to the Regulations in 16 FED. REG. 9312 (1951). This provision states that the Comman-
dant will withhold issuance of a Port Security Card to any person with respect to whom
administrative or judicial proceedings are currently pending to determine any of the
factors listed in § 125.29, until such time as those proceedings are finally resolved.
1176 [Vol. 62:1163
HeinOnline -- 62 Yale L.J. 1176 1952-1953
SECURITY TESTS
later changed to require dismissal if "reasonable doubts" of loyalty were found
to exist 78
The Review Process
The Commandant's determination that clearance will be denied is presented
to the applicant as an accomplished fact. A form letter notifies the applicant
of the denial and of his right to appeal. This opportunity is created by
Executive Order 10173, giving "persons who are refused employment or who
are refused the issuance of documents or who are required to surrender such
documents" an appeal to tripartite boards. 7 The Executive Order directs
the boards to insure appellants "all fairness consistent with the safeguarding
of national security."8 0
Although the Regulations implementing the Executive Order provided for
a tripartite board in each Coast Guard District, the clearance of union and
management board members continued to delay matters. As a result, the
informal appeal procedure of the voluntary program was retained for several
months before the formal procedure was in operation. Under the tripartite
system as finally established, the board member who represents the Coast
Guard is designated chairman; for each case he chooses the other members
from panels of management and labor members. An appellant is notified in
advance of the composition of the board which will hear his appeal and may
peremptorily challenge one management and one labor member of the board.
Any member may be challenged upon a showing of good cause.8 '
The appellant may (but need not) make a written answer to the "charges"
-that is, to the notification in general terms that he fails to satisfy one or
more of the criteria. If he wants time to prepare for the hearing, we are
advised that continuances are freely given. At the hearing, the appellant may
be represented by counsel or other representative of his own choosing, and
may elect whether the hearing is to be conducted in open or closed session.
But in either case the chairman is given authority to prevent any disclosure
of data inimical to the security of the United States. A verbatim record is
kept and in case of an adverse ruling by the Commandant the appellant may
obtain a copy of it.8s2
The chairman is responsible for the conduct of the hearing. At the outset,
the appellant is told that he is not on trial, but that the board is convened to
allow him to present evidence to show why he should be cleared. Indeed, the
7M Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 FED. REG. 3690 (1951), amending Exec. Order No.
9835, 12 FED. REX. 1935 (1947).
79. Exec. Order No. 10173, § 6.10-9, 15 FED. Rm. 7005 (1950).
80. Ibid.
81. 33 CoDE FED. RPr.s. §§ 121.19, 121.21 (Supp. 1952). A third panel of public mem-
bers is available in case of shortage or challenge but the Regulations provide that the
members of each board (other than the chairman) shall, so far as practicable, represent
management and labor.
82. 33 id. § 121.23.
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board members are directed to avoid the attitude of prosecutor,8a3 and the
Coast Guard presents no evidence. The only evidence adduced is that which
comes from the appellant, either on his own initiative or in response to
questions by the board. An appellant has an option whether or not to testify
under oath, is under no compulsion to answer questions, and, in general, can
present his evidence in any way he desires. The scope of the board's question-
ing in these hearings appears to have been virtually unlimited: questions about
economic or political views, family affairs, or church affiliations are apparently
frequent. Many of the questions are based on information contained in the
investigating agency's file, which all board members usually read before the
hearing. It is said to be common practice for the chairman to question an
appellant about every piece of derogatory information in the file, unless the
questions might reveal the source of the information. The appellant may not
see the contents of the file. Thus information about which questions are not
asked will often not be revealed to the applicant during the hearing. In some
instances, however, boards have suggested to an appellant that it would be
a good idea for him to submit some particular type of evidence so that it
would appear in the record.8 4 This is probably an oblique way of giving the
appellant an opportunity to refute allegations which, supposedly for security
reasons, the boards do not raise at the hearing.
Upon the basis of this hearing and the file, the board makes its recom-
mendation to the Commandant. 85 A statement of reasons is included, as well
as any dissent with a signed statement of the dissenter's reasons. The recom-
mendation of the board is not disclosed to the appellant. The Commandant
may then make his decision or remand the case to the board for further
information. Finally the appellant is notified of the Commandant's decision
to grant clearance or to sustain the denial.
If the Commandant's decision goes against the appellant, he has a further
right of appeal to the National Appeal Board, which sits only at Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington. This tribunal has a tripartite membership and
procedures identical to those of the regional boards.80 Once again a recom-
mendation is made to the Commandant who makes a final determination to
grant or deny clearance and notifies the appellant."7 In effect, therefore, the
83. 33 id. § 121.23(b).
84. See testimony of Tilden H. Edwards, Hearing Examiner, Transcript of Record,
p. 146 et seq., Parker v. Lester,--F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953).
85. "If, after considering all relevant factors, the Board is of the opinion that the
national security will not be endangered by security clearance, it shall so recommend;
otherwise, an adverse recommendation shall be made." If the board feels further investi-
gation should be made on any material matter it may so recommend, identifying, if pos-
sible, the persons or sources from which additional data should be sought. Exec. Order
No. 10173, § 6.10-9, 15 Fx. REG. 7005 (1950).
86. 33 CODE FED. REs. §§ 121.25 (e), 121.27, 121.29 (Supp. 1952).
87. 33 id. § 121.31. This provision states, "The Commandant is the final authority to
grant or deny security clearance."
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appeal procedure amounts to two opportunities to convince the Commandant,
through the boards, that his original determination %as wrong. At no stage
does anyone other than the Commandant have authority to make a decision.
And, if clearance is subsequently granted, the Regulations do not provide for
reimbursing an appellant for his expenses and enforced idleness.
The Program in Operation
These seemingly elaborate arrangements are shot through with inadequacies.
They begin with a determination of ineligibility in which the seaman has no
voice, and of which indeed he has no notice until he is denied clearance. The
denial is a form letter couched in stereotyped terms. In the common case,
that of alleged subversive associations, the letter merely parrots that portion
of the Regulation making such association a criterion for denial. Sometimes
the form of denial used goes so far as to state that the Communist Party is
the organization in question. But, so far as we know, no more information
is given. There is no way to compel a bill of particulars. Times and places
may be vouchsafed at the appeal session, if the Coast Guard's chairman finds
any in the file and thinks it discreet to disclose them. Anything resembling
confrontation with the evidence or with adverse witnesses is again a matter
of grace. If the regional board makes an unfavorable recommendation, the
appellant to the National Board is left to guess what charges he failed to
refute. Finally, it is worth repeating that the appellant's shots in the dark are
all aimed at the inaccessible Commandant, who decides but does not hear.
In no way can one fit together pieces to make out a hearing in the conventional
administrative law sense. The whole tenor of the Coast Guard scheme is that
the seaman's opportunity to speak is to be considered an appeal from action
already taken on undisclosed evidence.
Records of actual hearings are rarely available, and in any event would
not tell us much about the ultimate bases of judgment, because the student
can never know what has been withheld. But the inadequacy of the formal
record only emphasizes the burden on the appellant. Litigation involving the
program, shortly to be described, has uncovered some interesting bits and
pieces, a summary of which may add color to the general criticisms just made.
How representative these instances are, one cannot say.
In one case, the Commandant stated in affidavits the formal allegations
against some of the plaintiffs seeking to enjoin the progr-am, and then sum-
marized the conclusions that led to denial of clearance8s Ordinarily these
conclusions would never be disclosed to the appellant. Thus, as to one Parker,
the charge was that "you have been affiliated with or are a member of the
Communist Party and sympathetic to its policies and principles." Clearance
was denied, the Commandant said, because it was established that Parker was
88. Affidavit of Vice-Admiral Merlin O'Neill, dated May, 1951, filed in Parker v.
Lester,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953).
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a Party member in 1947, and his later behavior was strongly suggestive of
continued membership. 9 Allegations and conclusions with respect to other
plaintiffs ran as follows:
Mendelsohn: "Believed to be a Communist Party member and to have
subscribed to and aided in the distribution of Communist literature and publi-
cations." Found to have been a member from 1936, Mendelsohn claimed that
he was expelled in 1949. But, the Commandant said, Mendelsohn would
rejoin the party if it would accept him."0
White: "Believed to have been affiliated with or a member of the Com-
munist Party and sympathetic to its policies and principles." Party member-
ship in 1948 and sympathetic activities thereafter were the supposed basis for
the denial of clearance to White.91
Kulper: "Believed to be affiliated with or sympathetic to the principles
of organizations, associations, groups, or combinations of persons, subversive
or disloyal to the government of the United States." Communist Party mem-
bership was not established, only "distribution of literature of the Communist
Party" and other sympathetic behavior. The regional board recommended
clearance; the Commandant's decision is unknown.
9 2
Payney: "Believed to be affiliated with or a member of the Communist
Party and sympathetic to its policies and principles." Payney was cleared.U
Rolfe: (charge not given) The basis for decision against Rolfe was the
Commandant's belief in his total sympathy with the Party, which he did not
join, it was said, only because membership would grieve his mother.94
89. Id. at 19: "Information in my possession which I believe and have reason to
believe indicates" that he was "a suspected courier for the Communist Party in 1948;
that he associates with known members of the Party, and has been engaged in the dis-
tribution of subversive literature, and is sympathetic to organizations on the Attorney
General's list of subversive organizations."
90. Id. at 20: "[I]n 1942 this man was an agitator spreading dissatisfaction among
troops going to the Pacific theater of war, stated he was a Communist, was a distributor
of Communist literature, and spoke in favor of Communism."
91. Id. at 21: ".... has been an associate of Party members ... wrote letters protest-
ing the trial of Communist leaders before Judge Medina."
92. Affidavit of Vice-Admiral Merlin O'Neill, dated Oct., 1951, filed in Parker v.
Lester,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953), p. 27. Affidavit, supra note 88, at p. 21:
... has spoken of the Communist Party in terms of highest praise."
93. Affidavit, supra note 88, at p. 21.
94. Id. at 22: ". . . has been to Moscow; that he has refrained from joining the
Communist Party only because of his belief that such action would be displeasing to his
mother; that he is a Communist sympathizer; has solicited people to join the Party;
habitually reads Communist literature; that he wrote to Judge Learned Hand of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit complaining that Judge Medina
was not impartial in the recent trial of Communist leaders, that he had failed to select a
jury properly, and was doing his utmost to influence the jury against the defendants.
He was reported to have torn down an American flag at a MC&S meeting in Cleveland,
1180 [Vol, 62 :1163
HeinOnline -- 62 Yale L.J. 1180 1952-1953
SECURITY TESTS
One longshoreman's case alleged and found repeated drunkenness on the
job.95
This scanty sample of cases illustrates the limited extent to which the
wholly stereotyped initial charges are ever amplified. It also suggests that
a bench mark for denial of clearance is recent Party membership (or intimate
association equivalent to membership) and subsequent behavior consistent ith
continued membership. One would therefore expect the questioning at hear-
ings to probe directly for the appellant's rejoinders to evidence of Party
activities at specific times and places. But if we turn to the transcripts of tvwo
hearings that were involved in another case (involving different individuals
from those just listed) we find that the interrogations merely skirt the sup-
posedly crucial issues.
Guy J. Wickliffe, a Negro waiter and member of the Marine Cooks and
Stewards, was charged, in the usual meaningless terms, with affiliation or
sympathy with a subversive group, etc. The chairman described this charge
as "a general letter which is written to everyone." At the hearing, in Febru-
ary, 1951, the chairman first let it be knovn that the subversive group which
the Commandant had in mind was the Communist Party; and later, in a burst
of candor, revealed that Wickliffe was reported to be a Party member in
June, 1950. But his only specific questions were directed to Progressive
Party activities in 1948, to certain peace rallies, and like matters. Wickliffe
denied Party membership. Pressed by Wickliffe for details about his alleged
Party activity, the chairman said that he had been informed of none. The
entire hearing lasted one hour and forty minutes, and much of that time was
taken up with extended remarks by the appellant and the union representa-
tive who accompanied him, about general issues of communism and the posi-
tion of Negroes. 90
George B. Rogers, who had been sixteen years at sea as a steward, was
also a member of the MCS. While Wickliffe was voluble, Rogers was terse.
Wickliffe demanded and got more information about the charges; Rogers
neither asked nor got any. Wickliffe was equivocal in his attitudes toward
communism; Rogers straightforwardly declared himself as opposed to com-
munism now and in the past, and volunteered several instances of non-com-
munist activity. The only "derogatory" information brought out by the ques-
tioning was that in 1948 Rogers had twice rented the basement of his house
to Progressive Party members for parties, apparently of the fund-raising type,
which he did not himself attend; and that he had bought a ticket in a raffle
and to have said at an M[C&S meeting in San Francisco in August, 1950: 'The union
comes before God and my Country.' He has been a speaker at meetings of organizations
on the Attorney General's subversive list."
95. Affidavit of Vice-Admiral Merlin O'Neill, dated Oct., 1951, filed in Parker v.
Lester,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953), p. 30.
96. In the Matter of Guy J. Wickliffe, Z-696639, Seattle Appeal Case No. 13 (13th
Coast Guard District, Feb. 13, 1951).
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on a Nash car which was sponsored by the Northwest Labor School.01 On
the basis of this transcript, the denial of clearance can be explained in only
two ways: either Rogers was lying, or the reviewing authorities had a mo-
mentary lapse into irrationality.
If the Coast Guard had any direct evidence of Party membership in the
Wickliffe and Rogers hearings, that evidence was not opened to attack in
any way. And if the few circumstantial episodes which were disclosed and
which formed the basis for questioning were considered significant, why was
the appellant not previously advised of them? A Coast Guard spokesman
recently stated: "It isn't long after the Board begins its questions that the
man has a pretty good idea of why he's being denied a port security card.
He then has a chance to refute." s08 Is this fair play? Again, as a matter of
fairness, is it a merit or demerit of the system that the board has a chance
to study the demeanor of the appellant when an unsuspected issue is thrown
at him?
Responses to the Program
The lack of wide opposition to the program suggests that the Coast Guard
may be entitled to blessings in heaven, whatever its procedural weaknesses
on earth. But while we note the dearth of criticism, it is appropriate to recall
the prior commitment of the right-wing unions to the program. Injured
individuals within their ranks have no effective forum unless the union officers
and the union newspaper take up their cause. The likelihood that an injured
individual will receive union support is particularly slight if he happens to be
in factional opposition to the leadership. In the case of the NMU, there have
been dark charges that the leaders have sent the names of such persons to the
Coast Guard as security risks.99 There is no evidence to suggest that the
Coast Guard has taken intra-union dissidence as proof of subversion; but it
is not likely that it would completely ignore the warnings of practical experts
on waterfront communism. Thus far the anti-communist unions have largely
confined their criticism to the delays in the early phases of the program and
to the replacement of the voluntary program with the statutory one, a move
which appeared to reflect on their capacity for self-help. 100
97. In the Matter of George B. Rogers, Z-631869, Seattle Appeal Hearing No. 89
(13th Coast Guard District, July 13, 1951).
98. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1953, p. 59, col. 2.
99. See Letter to Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, from Committee for Democratic
Unionism, N.M.U., dated Sept. 14, 1950 (mimeo.). Joe Curran claimed to have a list
of at least 200 "articulate Communists" who were exposed by their position on roll-call
votes at the annual convention on two resolutions, one calling for expulsion of all Com-
munists from the NMU and the other promising support to the country in the event of
war with Russia. All negative voters and abstainers made Curran's list. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1950, p. 55, col. 1.
100. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1950, p. 45, col. 2.
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Consequently, it has been left to the outcast MCS and ILWVU to question,
on behalf of the men, the necessity and legality of the Port Security Program.
Initially, it was argued, and with some point, that the program was discrimina-
tory and useless because passengers, who were free of restrictions, could carry
out all the dastardly acts feared from traitorous sailors. This was not com-
pletely true, because passengers do not have the run of the ship, nor are they
likely to accompany critical military cargoes. In any case, the State Depart-
ment took the edge off this particular charge of discrimination by tightening
passport and visa restrictions.101 An itinerant revolutionary would be hard
put to decide whether he would have a better chance of slipping through the
mesh as a passenger or as a crew member. A second charge of discrimination
was based on the fact that seamen on foreign-flag vessels, even those from
communist nations, were allowed to enter our ports and to circulate freely on
shore.' 0  But in the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952,103 we fol-
lowed Russia's lead in restricting this ancient and amiable indulgence and
began to screen foreign seamen as well as our own. The only sanction against
foreigners, however, is denial of shore leave in American ports.
Frontal attacks on the good faith and good sense of the program, appear-
ing in publications and resolutions of the left-wing unions, were given formal
expression in a unique move by the M1arine Cooks and Stewards Union early
in 1951. Through the World Federation of Trade Unions it filed a complaint
with the Committee on Freedom of Association of the International
Labour Office against the United States Government, charging violation
of trade union rights.1°0 The complaint alleged that industrial blacklists had
been established by the Coast Guard under the guise of security regulations,
with the intent of breaking up labor unions and preventing union members
from engaging in political activities. Such practices are condemned by either
conventions or labor standards recommendations of the ILO.103 The State
Department presented a detailed and vigorous refutation of these charges and
101. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952); American 'isa Policy and Foreign
Scientists, 8 BULUETIN OF THE ATomIC Scm nsTs 210 et seq. (Oct. 1952).
102. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1952, § V, p. 8, col 1; id. Apr. 2, 1952, p. 32, col. 2;
Chasan & Starr, Our Unprotected Seaports: A Cinch for Saboteurs, Sat. Eve. Post, July
19, 1952, p. 17.
103. Pub. L. No. 414, 832d Cong., 2d Sess. c. 477 (June 27, 1952).
104. Case No. 33, SrITH REPoRT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR Ona.ANSAT N: To
THE UNITED NATIONS 212 (1952). On March 23, 1952, MCS, through its president, filed
another complaint with the Secretary, General of the United Nations, addressed to the
Economic and Social Council, alleging the United States Government's violation of trade
union rights embodied in (1) General Assembly Resolution 128(11) (1947); (2) the
freedom of association convention adopted at the 31st session of the ILO; (3) Art.
55(C) of the Charter of the UN. There has apparently been no action tahen upon this
"complaint."
105. SIxTH REPORT OF THE IxTE N,,TIONA.%L LALoUR ORGANISATION To TUB Uxnm=
NAnoxs 44 et seq. (1952).
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asked that the complaint be dismissed. 1°6 The ILO Committee, tinder the
chairmanship of former Premier Paul Ramadier of France, found none of the
allegations valid and dismissed the matter. 10 7 Of a more conventional char-
acter, in April, 1951, an action was begun in the San Francisco federal district
court in the name of ten rejected individuals drawn from both the MCS and
ILWU. In seeking injunctive relief, the complaint did not challenge the con-
stitutionality of the Magnuson Act; it did allege that the Regulations and
actions taken under them were not authorized by that statute. Judge Harris
adopted the Government's argument that, whatever the ultimate merit of
petitioners' claims, a preliminary injunction should be denied as detrimental
to national security.'0 8 The issue of a permanent injunction did not come to
trial until late in July, 1952. By this time, the parties had agreed to narrow
the issues in order to make this proceeding, Parker v. Lester,10 a test case
on the validity of the program as applied to sailors. Allegations which referred
to other waterfront workers were dropped.
Meanwhile a criminal prosecution, United States v. Gray,"0 had been com-
menced in Seattle. In the early days of the program, limited personnel for
enforcement had made some evasion possible, including the lending and rent-
ing of Port Security Cards to uncleared men."' Seamen without validated
papers might also get temporary work on ships in port, because this work
would not involve the formality of signing articles for a voyage.112 It was
apparently for a breach of this latter sort that three members of the Marine
Cooks and Stewards were indicted in March, 1952. All had been denied
clearance, had unsuccessfully appealed, and now were charged with violation
of the regulations by accepting employment on a ship. In June, 1952, before
106. See Case No. 33, supra note 104, at 213 et seq. See, also, the reply prepared
for the State Department by the Coast Guard. U.S. CoAsT GUARD LAW BULL., No. 194,
p. 1 (May, 1952).
107. Case No. 33, supra note 104, at 218; N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1952, p. 30, col. 5.
108. Parker v. Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Calif. 1951), appeal dismissed for %twnt
of prosecutions, 191 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1951).
109. Parker v. Lester,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953).
110. Crim. Nos. 13499-13501, W.D. Wash., 1952.
111. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1952, p. 95, col. 7.
112. In January, 1952, § 121.16 of the Regulations was amended, 17 FED. REG. 658,
to close this loophole. The pertinent amendments provide:
"c. The categories of vessels listed in paragraph (a) of this section are
considered to be engaged in trade whether at anchor or made fast to a dock,
loading or unloading passengers or cargo, or merely in an idle status await-
ing passengers or cargo, but are not to be considered to be engaged in trade
if laid up or dismantled or out of commission.
"d. By employment is meant the engagement of a person to fill any
licensed or certificated berth on board ship whether or not under articles
and includes those engaged for standby, relief, or other capacities."
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Parker v. Lester had come to trial, Judge Bowen granted defendant's motion
to dismiss the indictment in United States v. Gray.113 He found the Executive
Order and the Commandant's Regulations partly invalid. He held that the
defendants were denied due process of law because they were not advised of
the charges and were not "accorded a hearing thereon." Another statement
of the same infirmities, however, was qualified by the court's observation that
the "defendants were already in the status of employees in the merchant marine
at the time the acts complained of in these indictments were committed." It
is not clear whether the court, in making this qualification, meant to draw
a sharp line between employees and newcomers. This distinction was not
pursued in the briefs on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
While the appeal in United States v. Gray was pending, Parker v. Lester
was finally decided by the district court in April, 1953.114 The court observed:
"Where national security is involved, the courts have gone far in permit-
ting limitation of the usual procedural protections."1ia Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs were accorded partial relief. "[N]o reason appears why the Com-
mandant could not apprise petitioners of the basis for his initial determination
with such specificity as to afford them reasonable notice and an opportunity
to marshal the evidence in their behalves ... [A] bill of particulars should be
furnished upon demand and the petitioners should be given an opportunity to
rebut specific allegations. . ... ,n6 But on another critical issue, the court
said, "[The] opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse
witnesses cannot be afforded a petitioner in these situations without destroying
the security program. '117
While these cases wound their way through the courts, the Coast Guard
had gone stolidly ahead with the program. As has been intimated, it mas
quite unequal to the initial burden; the entire Coast Guard in October, 1950,
numbered about 2,500 officers and 20,500 enlisted men, plus some civilian
employees and a handful of hearing examiners.118 These examiners, acting
as board chairmen, bore the brunt of clearing up the backlog of appeals. They
were spurred on by importunities rarely encountered by these quasi-judicial
officers. One examiner tells us that his office was besieged by the distraught
wives and children of unemployed sailors whose cases were unresolved. But
in time the docket was cleared up. Early in 1953, the Coast Guard was able
to announce that it had completed the screening of about 250,000 waterfront
workers and 336,000 seamen, or more than 90 percent of all the active workers
113. Crim. Nos. 13499-13501, V.D. Wash., 1952.
114. -F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953). Page references following are to a mimeo-
graphed copy of the opinion helpfully supplied by G. J. Lanning, Esq., Ass't Chief Coun-
sel, U.S.C.G.
115. Id. at 18.
116. Id.at20-21.
117. Id.at 19.
118. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1950, p. 55, coL 2.
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in the industry."09 Its task for the future is chiefly to keep up with new-
comers, who doubtless account for the less than 10 percent currently in process.
LEGALITY OF THE PROGRAM
Is a program for screening maritime employees authorized by the Mag-
nuson Act? If so, does that Act set up standards sufficiently definite to evade
any lingering vitality in the doctrine of improper delegation of legislative
powers? Even if the program outlined in Executive Order 10173 is authorized,
do the Commandant's Regulations insure maritime workers "all fairness con-
sistent with the safeguarding of national security" as the order directs? Is
this direction merely a restatement of the constitutional requirement of due
process, or does it attempt to modify traditional constitutional standards?
Should not the procedures of any program under the Act be required to con-
form to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act? In a word,
just how far can the Government go in barring individuals on grounds of
national security from jobs not in the Government, but in the private maritime
industry? These are questions that the Supreme Court, one hopes, will even-
tually face. Not all of these issues have been raised in the two cases now on
their way up, but complete analysis of the program requires consideration of
each of them.
First let us consider the legal problems that are peculiar to this program,
119. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1953, p. 45, col. 6. The following is a summary of Coast
Guard Security screening as of May 1, 1953 (Source: Communication from Capt. K. S.













Cleared but later denied because of subsequent
information
Denied and then cleared due to additional
information
Total cleared after original denial
Appeal Bd. recommendations overruled by
Commandant:
Local appeal bd.-favorable recommendation
Local appeal bd.-unfavorable
National Appeal Bd.
Total in denial status May 1, 1953












































1186 [Vol. 62 :1163
HeinOnline -- 62 Yale L.J. 1186 1952-1953
SECURITY TESTS
and then, more generally, the requirements of due process in denials of private
employment for security reasons.
Authority for the Program
Because evidence is sparse as to just what Congress intended when it passed
the Magnuson Act, it may be argued that Congress neither contemplated nor
intended to authorize a screening program for maritime employees.2O The
Act itself makes no specific mention either of personnel in the maritime trades
or of a screening program. It merely gives the President power to institute
measures and issue rules and regulations,
"to safeguard against destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or
other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of similar nature,
vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities . .
The bill was drafted in the Department of justice and, upon unanimous con-
sent of the Senate, was introduced by Senator Magnuson as an emergency
measure, so there were no prior readings of the bill. The Senator's intro-
ductory speech, which came in the midst of debate upon other matters, men-
tioned the danger of foreign-flag vessels smuggling an atomic bomb or bacteria
into the country, declared the need for giving the President authority to con-
trol such vessels in American waters without declaring a complete emergency,
and stated:
"Furthermore, the bill will allow the President to invoke security
measures on the waterfronts-that is to say, around the docks. In
my opinion, the bill will have the dual effect of helping clean out
whatever subversive influences may exist around the waterfronts
and of protecting the country from sneak attacks of the sort I have
mentioned. Some of the last strongholds of the Communists in this
country exist in some of the waterfront unions, despite the efforts
of patriotic maritime labor leaders to clean out some of those unions.
"Under the provisions of this bill, the President could, and prob-
ably would, call on the Coast Guard, the FBI, or such other Govern-
ment agencies as he might wish to use, to give us such waterfront
security.i''9
Senator Magnuson concluded: "This measure will give the President the
authority to invoke the same kind of security measures which were invoked
in World War I and World War II.' ' 23 Representative Celler introduced
the measure in the House of Representatives under similar circumstances
with similar general remarks, but he made no mention at all of the danger
of subversive maritime employees.'-' Both the House and Senate Committee
120. This issue was raised in both Parker v. Lester--F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif.
1953), and United States v. Gray, Crim. Nos. 13499-13501, W.D. Wash. 1952.
121. See p. 1172 szpra.
122. 96 CoNG. REc. 10794 (1950).
123. Id. at 10795.
124. Id. at 11220.
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reports on their bills were extremely brief and made no explicit reference to
a maritime personnel screening program.1 25
Although the wording of the Magnuson Act does not clearly grant authority
to the President to initiate a program for the screening of personnel, it can
be argued that Senator Magnuson's declaration that the bill authorized "the
same kind of security measures" as those taken during the two World Wars
shows an intention to authorize a screening program. 120  Since the World
War II security procedures included personnel screening, Congress must have
intended to reinstitute a screening program. And since the World War II
screening procedures were more arbitrary than the present program,'-"
a fortiori this less arbitrary program must be sanctioned. Moreover, since
the World War II procedures were never challenged as unauthorized, Con-
gress had no reason to believe it had to be any more explicit in this legis-
lation than it was in the Act of 1917.128
A realistic layman might conclude that Congress never even considered
what measures were to be employed when it passed the Magnuson Act.
Indeed, during the trial of the Parker case the petitioners attempted to in-
troduce a letter from Senator Magnuson, purporting to state that the Port
Security Program, as it had developed, was not at all like the security meas-
ures he had envisaged upon introducing his bill.1 29  Understandably, the
court found it inadmissible.
125. H.R. REP. No. 2740, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); SEN. REP. No. 2118, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
126. Judge Murphy in Parker v. Lester,--F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953), referred
to this statement in dismissing the authorization issue in one sentence: "A glance
at the legislative history of the statute especially the above-quoted statement by Senator
Magnuson also disposes of petitioners' argument that the regulations setting forth the
screening procedure were not contemplated and authorized by the statute." Mimeo., n.114
szpra, at 15.
127. See sources cited note 44 sicra. The Directive of the Commandant of July
20, 1942 delegated complete responsibility for determining whether a person would be
denied access to or removed from a vessel or waterfront facility to the District Coast
Guard Officers, who were permitted to subdelegate to Captains of Ports. Such action
was to be predicated upon a finding of reasonable grounds to believe that the individual
was a saboteur, spy, subversive, unsuitable criminal, drunkard, mental defective, or one
"whose presence on board a vessel or on a waterfront facility would, for any reason not
listed herein, constitute a menace to the national security or to the safety of life or prop-
erty." No formal appeal procedure was provided, but a person denied access to or re-
moved from a vessel could submit statements or evidence to the Captain of Port or District
Coast Guard Officer who would "if practicable, interview the man concerned and forward
the statements or evidence to the Commandant with his recommendations .. . all cases
of denial or removal will be reviewed by the Commandant ...and his action will be
final."
128. The Government has also argued that Congress has ratified the interpretation
given the Magnuson Act by the Regulations by repeatedly enacting appropriations ear-
marked for the security program. Brief for Appellant, United States v. Gray, Nos. 13499-
13501 (9th Cir. 1952), p. 28.
129. Transcript of Record, p. 138, Parker v. Lester,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif.
1953). Counsel for petitioners argued that the letter, dated July 2, 1952, constituted a
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But the likelihood that Congress did not consider exactly what measures
it was authorizing when it passed the Magnuson Act does not mean that a
screening program is legally unauthorized. It merely requires a court to
determine what authority can be implied from the language of the Magnuson
Act and the Act of 1917 which it amends. And language granting the Presi-
dent power to "institute such measures and institute such rules and regula-
tions" to safeguard waterfront facilities and vessels seems adequate to authorize
d screening program of persons employed on such vessels or waterfront facil-
ities.
Delegation of Power
But a conclusion that this vague grant of power authorizes the President
to use a screening program as one measure to safeguard maritime facilities
immediately raises another problem. Does the Act prescribe a sufficiently
definite standard to avoid invalidity as an improper delegation of legislative
power?
There is probably little effective life left in the doctrine that Congress can-
not delegate "except under the limitation of a prescribed standard."'O Perhaps
where the delegation includes the drastic power to exclude from a calling,
some specificity of standards may be required.13 ' But the Supreme Court in
recent years has consistently upheld such standards as "public interest'ilm
and "public convenience, interest, or necessity,"' 33 which are no more precise
than the standard implicit in the power delegated in the Magnuson Act.
Moreover, some cases have upheld delegations that did not even specify a
standard. 3 As for other facets of the delegation question, there is no longer
any doubt about the power of Congress to authorize an agency to issue regu-
lations, the violation of which is made subject to criminal sanctions.13 5 Nor
is there any serious question about the power of the executive to subdelegate
to the head of an agency authority delegated to him by Congress.'0 Thus it
would appear that the screening program could survive any attack on grounds
subsequent statement of legislative history and was thus admissible to show that the
program was unauthorized. The court held that the letter vas mere argument.
130. United States v. Chicago, M., St.P. & P.R.R., 232 U.S. 311, 324 (1931). See
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 41 ct seq. (1951).
131. Cf. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 393 (1944); Wright v. SEC, 112
F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940) ; DAviS, op. cit. supra note 130, at 66 c seq.
132. Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924); N.Y. Central Securities Corp.
v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
133. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co., 2.89 U.S. 266 (1933).
134. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S.
476 (1914).
135. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); McKinley v. United States, 249
U.S. 397 (1919).
136. See DAvis, op. cit. supra note 130, at 79; Grundstein, Presidential Subdelegalinr.
of Addnistrative Authority i Wartime, 16 G. WAsH. L Pxv. 301, 478 (1943). In 1950
Congress enacted a blanket authorization to the President to delegate to Department heads
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of improper delegation. There remains only a faint probability that the Court
might combine (1) the uncertainty whether Congress contemplated a person-
nel security program with (2) the absence of any explicit standards for such
a program, and invalidate the program on these grounds, in order to avoid
reaching the delicate issue of due process.
Due Process of Law and the Administrative Procedure Act
The most direct route for reaching the procedural inadequacies already
outlined is to argue that the Coast Guard Regulations are subject to the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 87 There is no doubt
that the Regulations prescribe procedures not sanctioned by the APA. For
example, Section 7(c) provides that "Every party shall have the right to
• ..conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts." It must be admitted that this and several other
Sections of the APA are violated in the program if that statute is appli-
cable.' 8
By way of Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, however, one
avenue of escape from the APA appears to be open to the Government, and
another is possible. Section 5 lays down procedural standards to be followed:
"In every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to the
extent that there is involved...
"4. The conduct of military, naval, or foreign affairs."' 8 9
The quickest escape is to say that military or naval affairs are involved in
the program.' 40 The only definition of the meaning of these terms in the
legislative history of the APA appears in the Attorney General's commentary
on the APA addressed to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. He wrote,
"In the fourth exception, the term 'naval' is intended to include adjudicative
defense functions of the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Marine Inspection
and Navigation, where such functions pertain to national defense."' 41 The
definition seems almost to have been shaped with the then still existing World
War II screening procedures in mind, and, if accepted, applies with equal
and to other officials appointed with the consent of the Senate, except when a statute
affirmatively prohibits such delegation. 64 STAT. 419 (1950), 3 U.S.C. §§301-303 (Supp.
1952).
137. 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1946).
138. E.g., § 5(c) (separation of functions) ; § 7(c) (burden of proof) ; § 7(d) (trans-
cript as exclusive record for decision) ; § 8(b) (right to submit proposed findings, con-
clusions, and exceptions) ; § 9(b) (revocation of licenses).
139. 60 STAT. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1946).
140. In Parker v. Lester,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953), Judge Murphy held:
"That act is on its face not applicable . . . Evidently, the President was operating in the
area of military and naval affairs." Mimeo., n.114 mpra, at 14.
141. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1946).
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force to the present ones. Though the commentary has no special weight as
legislative history, what it lacks in authority it makes up in plausibility.
The other possible way out of Section 5 has some of the characteristics of
a revolving door-you keep going around if you're not careful. It would
appear that the Coast Guard program does not concern a "case of adjudi-
cation required by statute"; the 'Magnuson Act is altogether silent about ad-
judication or hearing. But the Supreme Court in Wfong Yang Sung v. Mc
Grathi'0 a deportation case, held that the absence of a statutory provision
for an "adjudication . . . after opportunity for an agency hearing" was not
decisive of the APA's applicability. The requirement of a hearing might be
read into a statute in order to save it from unconstitutionality. If that were
the case, as Mr. justice Jackson wrote for the Court, Congress could hardly
have intended that a constitutionally required hearing should be accompanied
by fewer safeguards than one that was a matter of grace. "[T]he limiting
words [of Section 5] . . . exempt hearings of less than statutory authority,
not those of more than statutory authority." 1 3 However, the Court had pre-
viously determined that an alien in Wong's plight was constitutionally en-
titled to a hearing; in the Port Security cases that is precisely what is to be
decided. So, are we in or out of the APA? It is our contention that the
Constitution does require these proceedings to be adjudicated "on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing," and if the APA adds any helpful
refinements, well and good. But if we can get the Port Security Program
into the APA only by first resolving the constitutional issues, the APA is
not the easy solution we are looking for. Because of the "naval... affairs"
exemption, it is probably not a solution at all.
Protection of thw Fifth Amendment
Now, what does the Constitution require in a case like this? Due process
of law, we have assumed; but there have been certain recent cases in which
Fifth Amendment due process was effectively withheld, and we must either
distinguish them or give them decent burial before we can go on to consider
the content of due process. We summarily put to one side the recent cases
that have practically stripped aliens of constitutional protection agairist the
immigration authorities.1 4 Wickliffe and Rogers are native-born; Rogers
proudly hails from Cornerstone, Arkansas !'4 We can also avoid discussing
cases that involve the fullest exercise of the war power, for example the shock-
142. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
143. Id. at 50.
144. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL. Mezei, 345 U.S. 205 (1953);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 5S0 (1952); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524
(1952) ; United States ex reL. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See Develop-
nets in, the Law--Immigratiom and Nationality, 66 HARv. L. REv. 644, 672-6 (1953).
145. Op. cit. szpra note 97, at 3.
1953]
HeinOnline -- 62 Yale L.J. 1191 1952-1953
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ing Japanese-American detention cases ;146 fortunately, the present emergency
has not reached that pitch, and Wickliffe and Rogers are not Nisei.
We could also avoid the holding in Bailey v. Richardson,147 that the Govern-
ment does not have to afford due process in dismissing its own employees,
by reiterating the fact that the Coast Guard program bears on private employ-
ment. But that case deserves further attention because it is responsible for a
misleading doctrine. On the premise that employment in the executive depart-
ment is "at the will of the appointing authority, not for life or for fixed terms,"
the Court concluded that "to hold office at the will of a superior and to be
removable therefrom only by constitutional due process of law are opposite
and inherently conflicting ideas. Due process of law is not applicable unless
one is being deprived of something to which he has a right."148 The Supreme
Court affirmed Bailey v. Richardson by an equally divided court,
140 with
Justice Clark not participating. But two subsequent cases involving state
employees and the Fourteenth Amendment are inconsistent with the proposi-
tion that due process does not apply to job removals. In Adler v. Board of
Education,150 petitioners contended that a provision of New York's Feinberg
Law denied due process by making membership in a subversive organization
presumptive evidence of unfitness to teach. The Court did not deny the
pertinence of the due process argument. Instead, the Court implicitly accepted
its relevance by holding that it was not unreasonable to base a prima facie
case of disqualification on knowing membership in an organization that had
been found to advocate the overthrow of government by unlawful means.
Then, in Weiman v. Updegraff,1' 1 a unanimous Court held that an Oklahoma
loyalty oath for state employees "must fall as an assertion of arbitrary
power. . . .The oath offends due process" because it is tainted by an "in-
discriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity" in proscribed
organizations. Here the Court openly met the argument that there could
be no denial of due process because there was no right to public employment,
and said, "We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does
extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently
arbitrary or discriminatory."'1 52
146. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943). See Rostow, The Japanese American Cases: A Disaster, 54 YALS
L.J. 489 (1945).
147. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
148. Id. at 58.
149. 341 U.S. 918 (1951). As is customary in such cases, there were no written
opinions.
150. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
151. 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Justice Jackson not participating).
152. Id. at 192.
Though Weinan v. Updegraff disposes of Bailey v. Richardson's "no right-no due
process" doctrine, the attitude of the Supreme Court at the time it affirmed Bailey is note-
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If the Weinan case extends due process to public employment, a fortiori
the Fifth Amendment applies to private employment. So it is hardly neces-
sary to try to decide abstractly whether exclusion from private employment
pursuant to a statute is a deprivation of liberty, or property, or both.10 If
we characterize it as a property interest, as in a price or rate level, the path
of administrative process is straight and narrow. 4 There is, however, one
byway that seems to lead entirely away from due process standards. We
should therefore investigate it, but only briefly, for it is a blind alley. Seamen,
as a routine peacetime matter, must have licenses or certificates from the
Government to pursue their calling. If that fact conjures up the confusion
of doctrine surrounding the requirements for license revocation, stern exor-
cisms are called for. License revocations without due process are sometimes
justified by the proposition that the holding of the license is a mere privilege
and not a right. But, as we have just demonstrated in the case of employment
denials, the privilege-right dichotomy is meaningless. 15 License denials with-
out notice and a hearing are justified "if an occupation be one which serves
no socially useful purpose."' 5 6 Seafaring, however, is a socially useful occupa-
tion. Finally, it is noteworthy that the peacetime regulations under which
seamen's licenses may be denied or revoked are in fact models of full adminis-
trative due process.157
If we think of the right to pursue a calling as a liberty protected by the
Fifth Amendment, analogies are few.051 The most important one in our time
seems to be the deprivation of liberty endured by conscripts. Paradoxically,
worthy. The same eight Justices who split in that case simultaneously voted 5-3 to reverse
a dismissal of the complaint in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951), where the issue was the authority of the Attorney General of the
United States to designate organizations as "totalitarian, fascist, communist or subver-
sive." Justice Burton's opinion resulted in a narrow holding that, on the pleadings, the
Attorney General's action must be considered arbitrary. Space does not permit further
analysis of the case here; see BoNTEcou, THE FEDERAL LoYALTx-SEcunr r PrXo~nA
225-35 (1953). From the six opinions in the Joint Anti-Fascist case it seems reasonable
to deduce that a majority of the Court still recognizes that due process requires notice
and hearing where administrative action invades any substantial private right.
153. Cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1S97); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). See Butchers' Union v. Crescent City, 111 U.S. 746, 754, 760 (1834)
(concurring opinions).
154. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (193S) ; Ohio Bell Tel. Ce. %. Public
Utilities Comm., 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
155. DAvis, ADmINisTRArcE LAw 250 (1951); Byse, Opportunity to Be Heard is
License Issuance, 101 U. OF PA. L. REV. 57, 69 (1952).
156. Tuttrup, Necessity of Notice and Hcaring in the Re'ocation of Occupatior:al
Licenses, 4 Wis. L. REV. 180, 186 (1927). But see DAvis, op. dt. smpra note 155, at 251
et seq.
157. See sources cited in notes 37, 38 .supra.
158. See Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952) (revocation of pass-
port without notice and hearing a denial of due process because right to leave the country
is part of liberty).
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the courts have been rather less jealous of the administrative standards of
Selective Service than of the standards controlling public utility commissions;
the interpretations of due process in draft cases have not been expansive.160
The paradox is explainable, we think, on several grounds. First, service in
the armed forces, even if it is the result of coercion, still represents the
citizen's "supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights
and honor of the nation."'1 0 Second, there is the persistent supposition that
conscription signalizes an extraordinary emergency. Third, there is a strong
belief that, if the draft is to be fair, it must be all-inclusive. When the banner
of due process is borne by those claiming exemption, it commands less respect
than usual.
These attitudes are all illustrated in the very recent and relevant case of
United States v. Nugent.'10 The Selective Service Act,102 in providing for
the exemption of conscientious objectors, stipulates procedural arrangements
not available to other registrants. If the exemption is initially denied by the
local board and the case is before the appeal board, the statute directs the
Department of Justice to conduct an "inquiry" and a "hearing."106 The results
go as recommendations to the appeal board, which is not bound to follow them.
The registrant in the Nugent case claimed that he was entitled to have
access to the FBI's report (the statutory "inquiry") ; and the Second Circuit
so held.' a The Supreme Court, reversing, held that the statute and the Con-
stitution were satisfied when the registrant had an opportunity to present
evidence before the Department of Justice hearing officer, and when, as was
the practice, he was entitled to be advised of the "general nature and char-
acter" of "unfavorable" information in the investigation report. 05 In context,
the word "hearing" in the statute did not contemplate "formal and litigious
procedures," because the Department of Justice was not deciding anything.
The Court described the Department's role as that of an "auxiliary service"
in a "special class of cases." "The duty to classify-to grant or deny exemp-
tions to conscientious objectors-rests upon the draft boards, local and ap-
pellate, and not upon the Department of Justice."'"( The Department's only
duty is to "forward sound advice, as expeditiously as possible, to the appeal
159. Compare Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) (availability of limited
judicial review), with Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (denial of commission
under Doctors' Draft Law not unlawful discrimination).
160. White, C.J., in Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
161. 73 Sup. Ct. 991 (1953) (Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting;
Jackson, J., not taking part).
162. 62 STAT. 604 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 451 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
163. 62 STAT. 604, 613 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. §456(j) (Supp. 1952). See 32 CoDF.
FED. REas. § 1626.25 (Supp. 1952).
164. United States v. Nugent, 200 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1952), 101 U. OF PA. L. REV.
692 (1953).
165. Nugent v. United States, 73 Sup. Ct. 991, 994 (1953).
166. Id. at 995.
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board.'1 7 So construed, the statute does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
The Court pointed out that the Selective Service Act, designed to "impose
a common obligation of military service on all physically fit young men," Nwas
a "valid exercise of the war power.... [Its] procedures must be geared to
meet the imperative needs of mobilization and national vigilance. . ..."3
Thus, in the peculiar atmosphere surrounding Selective Service, the Court
held that "hearing" does not mean "hearing." And it may well be right,
so far as congressional intent is concerned, because the whole scheme of
Selective Service rests on the informed but informal decisions of the local
boards.6 9 These boards are not aloof judicial tribunals; their members are
drawn from the neighborhood: their obligation is to apportion the community's
quota fairly. The registrant seeking exemption dearly has the burden of
maldng out his claim; and the board may gather information in unconventional
ways. 70 The appeal boards are confined to the file collected by the local board,
and to a written statement by the appellant .'7  The FBI inquiry and the
Department of justice hearing for conscientious objectors are unique within
the system.
If all this represents due process, it has little bearing on our Coast Guard
problem. Selective Service leads to honorable military duty; Port Security
screening to the stigma of exclusion as a security risk. Congress has mitigated
the hardships of military service by re-employment rights and by the great
variety of veterans' benefits; the barred seaman is left to his own resources.
And on the precise issue decided by United States v'. Niget-the availability
of the FBI reports to the conscientious objector-it should be emphasized
that the Court treats these reports as part of an "auxiliary service," and that
their details are not disclosed either to the appellant or to the board which
decides his claim.'72 But the investigative materials withheld from subversive
167. Id. at 996.
168. Ibid.
169. See SIBL=y & JAcOB, Coscsu-nox oF Coziscmzc c. IV. (1952); Cornell,
Exemption from the Draft: A Study in ioil Liberties, 56 YA=E L.J. 253 (1947).
170. Compare United States ex reL. Trainin v. Cain, 144 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1944),
utith United States ex re. Levy v. Cain, 149 F.2d 33S (2d Cir. 1945) (permissible degree
of reliance on advisory panel of rabbis).
171. See 32 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 1626.12, 1626.24 (1951).
172. The opinion is unsatisfactory because it quite failed to meet this point, one that
troubled the dissenters and the able judges below whose views were overruled. The FBI
reports in question help shape the recommendations of the Department of Justice hearing
officers; these in turn presumably influence the appeal boards; see Swr]3- & J,%co,
CoNscPanox OF ConscIncE 76 (1952). But the reports are withheld from the appeal
boards as well as from the registrants. This remote reliance on unrebutted "secret police
reports," Judge Hincks said, raises a question whether the methods of selection are in-
deed "'fair and just' within our Anglo-Saxon concepts of justice and due process." United
States v. Geyer, 108 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Conn. 1952). Contra, Imboden v. United States,
194 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1952).
The Court also failed to give any consideration to the value that these reports would
have to the registrant, or to the policy grounds for withholding them. For a weak attempt
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seamen may be the blood and bones of the Commandant's decisions, both at
the beginning and at the end of the screening process.
The "liberty" of conscripts has required some digression, because of the
apparent pertinence of the Nugent case. If we may now assume that govern-
ment denial of private employment is not controlled by the law of aliens,
Nisei, government workers, liquor licensees, or conscripts, 73 we may move
on to the climactic problem: the meaning of administrative due process in
these security cases.
How Flexible Is Due Process?
So far, we are in agreement with judge Murphy's conclusion in Parker v.
Lester when he said, "The deprivations suffered by petitioners are substantial.
In the hierarchy of legally protected values, the right to private employment
occupies a lofty place-certainly a higher one than occupancy of a government
job or possession of a driver's license." "But," he continued, "judicial solici-
tude for the petitioners, however great, is limited by countervailing considera-
tions of equal magnitude. The countervailing consideration here in play is
the undoubted right of the Nation to protect itself from subversion. ' 17 4 To
that also, amen. What restrictions on liberty do these countervailing con-
siderations admit? To Judge Murphy, the "maximum procedural safeguards
which can be afforded petitioners without jeopardizing the security program"
include adequate notice of specific charges and opportunity to rebut them ;175
but, as has been earlier indicated, they stop short of confrontation and cross-
examination of adverse witnesses.'7 6 He decided also that due process does
not demand that the hearing be held before the suspects were kept off
vessels.' 7 7
One may agree that due process is a fluid concept, but its fluidity is intended
to accommodate it to the varying demands of fundamental justice, not to
facilitate pouring it down the drain. Before we capitulate to the demands of
national security (which in this case means chiefly the demands of security
officers to protect their sources of information), it should be recalled that the
very existence of the Port Security Program, or any similar one, is a con-
siderable invasion of liberty. Thus substantive rights, also subject to due
process, are put in jeopardy. If national security demands that communists
to formulate one, see Elder v. United States, 202 F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1953). These
cases all appear to involve only harmless information about the religious status of con-
scientious objectors; see Heisler, The Law Versus the Conscientious Objector, 20 U. or
Cal. L. Rzv. 441, 446 (1953).
173. The authors accept the state of the law of due process, to the extent that it
restricts the rights of these classes of persons, only as a necessity not a duty.
174. Parker v. Lester,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953). Mimeo., n.114 suIpra, at 17.
175. Id. at 19-21.
176. Id. at 20-21.
177. Id. at 20.
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or drunkards be kept off merchant ships, it becomes necessary to use the
utmost care to see that we are going no further than the situation requires.
We are now abandoning Judge Murphy to embrace the formula laid down
in the impressive dissent of Justice Jackson in Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei.178 In this very recent case a bare majority of the Court held
that an alien who, by reason of a protracted absence from the country, had
lost his status as a resident, could as an applicant for admission be detained
indefinitely on Ellis Island if no other country would give him shelter, and
that the law need not require the Attorney General either to disclose the reason
for exclusion or to grant any hearing. Even though Justice Jackson's reason-
ing could not persuade a majority of the Court in the present climate and in
an alien's case, surely it will gain the ascendancy in other times and circum-
stances. It is a pleasant necessity to quote key passages from his opinion, and
hard to avoid the temptation to include some of the Jacksonian barbs at the
spectacle of Mr. Mezei "putting the Government of the United States in such
fear that it was afraid to tell him why it was afraid of him.IUD We invite
the reader, wherever Justice Jackson refers to "detention of an alien" to sub-
stitute "exclusion of a seaman from his calling," and see how it fits.
"The interpretations of the Fifth Amendment's command that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, come about to this: reasonable general legislation
reasonably applied to the individual. The question is whether the
Government's detention of respondent is compatible with these tests
of substance and procedure."180
"Substantively, due process of law renders what is due to a strong
state as well as to a free individual. It tolerates all reasonable mea-
sures to insure the national safety, and it leaves a large, at times a
potentially dangerous, latitude for executive judgment as to policies
and means.
"After all, the pillars which support our liberties are the three
branches of government, and the burden could not be carried by our
own power alone. Substantive due process will always pay a high
degree of deference to congressional and executive judgment, es-
pecially when they concur, as to what is reasonable policy under
conditions of particular times and circumstances."'1'
"I conclude that detention of an alien would not be inconsistent
with substantive due process, provided-and this is where my dis-
sent begins-he is accorded procedural due process of la,,,....
"Procedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due
178. 345 U.S. 206, 218 (1953). The best documented discussion of the notice and
hearing elements of administrative due process is Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951). See,
also, Justice Douglas' powerful address on procedural due process to the American Law
Institute, May 20, 1953. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1953, p. 8, col. 3.
179. 345 U.S. 206, 219 (1953).
180. Id. at 222.
181. Ibid.
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process of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly requires.
Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than sub-
stantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with con-
ditions, and defers much less to legislative judgment. Insofar as it
is technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the
competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend before political
branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy
which comprise substantive law.
"If it be conceded that in some way this alien could be confined,
does it matter what the procedure is? Only the untaught layman or
the charlatan lawyer can answer that procedures matter not. Pro-
cedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of
liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and
impartially applied.' 18 2
"The most scrupulous observance of due process, including the
right to know a charge, to be confronted with the accuser, to cross-
examine informers and to produce evidence in one's behalf, is es-
pecially necessary where the occasion of detention is fear of future
misconduct, rather than crimes committed."'18
"Congress has ample power to determine whom we will admit to
our shores and by what means it will effectuate its exclusion policy.
The only limitation is that it may not do so by authorizing United
States officers to take without due process of law the life, the liberty
or the property of an alien who has come within our jurisdiction;
and that means he must meet a fair hearing with fair notice of the
charges. ' S4
"It is inconceivable to me that this measure of simple justice and
fair dealing would menace the security of this country. No one can
make me believe that we are that far gone."' 85
It would be superfluous to try to embroider the close fabric of Justice Jack-
son's argument. Nevertheless, what the Justice finds inconceivable is accepted
as sober fact by many responsible officials and observers. They believe that
the withholding of evidence is unavoidable, because to disclose it would end
the usefulness of undercover agents, and to expose witnesses to cross-exami-
nation would make them keep silent.'8 6 This proposition permeates the Port
Security Program, and every other federal security program. It is used to
excuse the vagueness of charges: if you tell a suspect in detail what his sub-
versive connections have been, he may be able to infer the source of the infor-
182. Id. at 224.
183. Id. at 225.
184. Id. at 228.
185. Ibid.
186. See note 188 infra, and accompanying text. See the testimony of J. Edgar
Hoover, Director of the FBI, Hearings before House Appropriations Committee on Dcp't
of J stice Appropriations Bill, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 245-7 (1947). See, also, Hoover,
4 Comment on the Article "Loyalty Among Government Employees," 58 YALE L.J. 401,
404, 410, 417 (1949).
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mation. It excuses the absence of confrontation: the Government cannot
afford to expend its informers. And cross-examination: how many citizens
will tell about their neighbor's strange doings if they may be subjected to the
ordeal of testimony? It excuses the extraordinary fact that the officials who
hear and decide may not even know the source of the charges: after all, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation cannot jeopardize its contacts with secret
agents T-3 and D4 and other confidential informants by revealing their
identity to civilian board members, or even to Vice-Admirals. So the Com-
mandant may be advised only that a source of "known reliability" has seen
the suspect's Party card. To whom is the reliability knon? To the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and "that," as one skeptical loyalty board member
was told by a reviewing official, "should be enough for you." 157
We do not propose to instruct the reader on the virtues of cross-examina-
tion and the unreliability of informers. Nor do we mean to lecture those
who believe that the FBI and other investigative agencies could not bear up
under the burdens of due process of law. In the recommendations that follov,
we will try to justify our view that this whole problem of confrontation is a
matter of police convenience, not of national necessity, and that it can be
resolved any time the courts bear down on the prosecutors. As we see it,
if the Congress and the Executive think it necessary to exclude private
citizens from a lawful calling on grounds of national security in an emergency
short of war, they can do it; but if they further think it necessary to eliminate
fair notice and hearing, they cannot do that. Reasonable men may disagree
on whether a fair hearing can exist without the right to cross-examine, but
the lack of this right cannot, from the standpoint of Justice Jackson, be
excused on the grounds of expediency.
If confrontation is really a life-and-death issue, the familiar process in
constitutional adjudication of balancing interests might come into play. One
extraordinary thing is that the courts are being asked to take judicial notice
of these alleged necessities on the most casual basis. The court in Parker
v. Lester based its decision on a press release, quoted from the [Vashington
Post, in which the late Seth Richardson, Esq., the first Chairman of the
Loyalty Review Board, reported the judgment of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation that
"[Practically none of the evidential sources available will continue
to be available to the Bureau if proper secrecy and confidence can-
not at all times be maintained with respect to the original source
of information, and that if the source of such information is to be
disclosed-save in the exceptional case-the Bureau can be of much
less service to the Board in making the essential basic investiga-
tion."ISS
187. Interview by senior author with a Loyalty Board member.
183. Washington Post, Dec. 28, 1947, p. 10, col. 3; Parker v. Lester-F. Supp.-
(N.D. Calif. 1952).
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Giving full weight to the integrity and responsibility of the FBI officials
whose views were thus disclosed, can the courts cut the heart out of the
constitutional requirement of notice and hearing on the authority of a press
release in the Washington Post?
PROPOSALS FOR ADEQUATE PROCEDURES
An outline of what we believe constitutional due process requires in this
sort of case will suffice to show that it does not require anything suicidal. A
step-by-step review of the controversial stages of a case results in these fairly
simple proposals:
1. The seaman must be given detailed notice of the charges against him.
Whether it is in the form of one document, or of a notice summarizing the
charges, followed by a bill of particulars, is not important, provided that the
summary initial notice makes it clear that the man is entitled on request to
whatever relevant details he needs to make his defense. 189 It is doubtless
convenient for the Coast Guard to serve a meaningless mimeographed state-
ment that clearance has been denied, in the language of the Executive Order,
whenever and wherever it catches up with an errant seaman. But surely with
airmail and other rapid communication facilities at its disposal it will require
little time to convey precise charges to a man when he comes ashore. The
possibility that a lawful notice will disclose confidential sources is no ground
for dispensing with it; the Coast Guard's alternatives to revealing such sources
are discussed under point 3 below.
2. Can a man already in maritime employment be excluded pending the
hearing and decision in his case ?l90 This is in itself a substantial deprivation,
because it may take a year to carry a case to its conclusion. At the same time,
if the dangers that the program guards against are real, they are scarcely
met by leaving a trained saboteur in a position to blow up the Panama Canal
while his case is under adjudication. Fortunately, there is a simple and
equitable escape from this dilemma: let the Government reimburse the sea-
man for lost wages if he is ultimately cleared. Back pay to compensate for
summary suspension that turns out to have been unnecessary is a familiar
189. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 279 et seq. (1951). See Parker v. Lester, supra
note 188, Mimeo., n.114 supra, at 20: "[I]n cases such as these, no reason appears why the
Commandant could not apprise petitioners of the basis for his initial determination with
such specificity as to afford them reasonable notice and an opportunity to marshal the
evidence in their behalves."
190. Cf. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950), involving multiple
seizures of goods under the Food and Drug Act, where it was held that "it is not a
requirement of the due process that there be judicial inquiry before discretion can be
exercised. It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some
stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination." Id. at 599 (emphasis
added).
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feature in labor law and arbitration ;191 more to the point, it is a part of the
new federal employees' security program. 19 2 We cannot assert with confidence
(as the decisions stand) that due process requires reimbursement; but re-
imbursement we think would eliminate any question of breach of due process
arising from screening first and hearing afterward.
The consequence of this proposal may be to create a claim for lost wages
in all those who have so far been cleared, and in any who may now be cleared
after their cases are re-opened. Since, as champions of due process, we con-
sider reimbursement only elementary justice,1 3 as taxpayers we can view
such a modest drain on the Treasury with equanimity. There are other hard-
ships imposed by a proceeding of this sort that not even money can assuage.
In future cases, however, the issue is likely to be of diminishing importance.
Most cases will concern newcomers to the industry. They can be required to
wait a reasonable time for security clearance, just as they must wait for the
processing of their certificates of competence.
3. At the heart of due process is the opportunity to face and rebut the
evidence on which the charges are based. This requirement does not mean
that the Government must unearth an informer every time it wants to bar a
communist. The problem is no different from that faced by a criminal prose-
cutor in many cases. If he wants to protect his undercover sources, he must
use their information only as leads on which to build an independent record.
There is a well-recognized evidentiary privilege which, under most circum-
stances, the prosecution can invoke to block inquiry into the source or content
of the original lead.194 If the prosecutor or investigator believes that the
191. See Note, 62 YALE L.J. 488 (1953) passim.
192. See note 1 supra. Pub. L. No. 733, 64 STAT. 476, 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (Supp. 1952),
the statutory basis for the new program, provides: "That any person whose emph~yment
is so suspended or terminated under the authority of this Act may, in the discretion of the
agency head concerned, be reinstated or restored to duty, and if so reinstated or restored
shall be allowed compensation for all or any part of the period of such suspension or
termination in an amount not to exceed the difference between the amount such persin
would normally have earned during the period of such suspension or termination, at the
rate he was receiving on the date of suspension or termination, as appropriate, and the
interim net earnings of such person. . . ." For similar provisions applicable to the now
defunct Federal Employees Loyalty Program, see Barnes v. United States, 103 F. Supp.
382 (Ct. Claims 1952).
193. The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 937, 50 U.S.C. § 731 c seq. (Supp.
1952), gives a person unjustly detained under the provisions of Title II (Emergency
Detention) the right to submit a claim to the Detention Review Board which has au-
thority to hear and determine such claims. Id. § 819(j). A detainee may appeal from an
order denying such indemnification. Id. § 821.
194. See Sanford, Eqidtntiary Privileges Against the Produection of Data aithi. tho
Control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REv. 73, 76 (1949); Donnelly, Judicial
Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigcons, and Agents Provocateurs, 60 Y=- UJ.
1091, 1094 (1951).
The privilege not to disclose the identity of an informer does not relieve the Govern-
ment of its obligation to prove a case by competent evidence. This is also true of the
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development of other evidence against the security suspect is too arduous, or
that it would lead to uncomfortably accurate inferences about the identity of
the original informer, the situation is awkward but not disastrous to national
security. Informers are expendable. To come down to cases, it seems unlikely
that the operative who is planted in a Communist Party cell can go on in-
definitely. In time he will be detected, or will have to be relieved from the
fatigue and psychological strain of leading a double life. At least so it would
seem to the innocent layman in these matters.' 95 Once he is brought above-
ground, as were the seven "plants" to testify in the Smith Act prosecution
of the first-string Communist leaders,'0 6 then he is available to testify in other
cases about all his observations. In his testimony he may be exposed to un-
pleasant cross-examination. That is part of the price of being an informer.
The opportunity to confront and examine is not an absolute requirement
of due process if there is some other way for a party to get a fair hearing. 10 7
But its indispensability to the respondent is nowhere clearer than in these
cases where the charge is usually one of subversive political activity, and the
evidence often from political spies. They may be paragons of patriotism, or
neurotic scoundrels (or both).10s The best way our law has discovered to
test their veracity is to put them on the witness stand. It will represent a
remarkable shift in our legal values when they give much weight to the
ex parte evaluation of a security officer, himself anonymous in many instances.
Government's privilege to withhold military secrets. See United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
195. See, e.g., CALOMIrRIS, RED MASQUERADE (1950); PHtumic, I LED 3 LivEs
(1952).
196. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; BoNTEcoU, op. cit. supra note 152,
at 134-5; Donnelly, sapra note 194, at 1122 et seq.
197. See GELLHORN, AMINisTRATIvE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 510 Ct seq. (2d
ed. 1947) ; DAvis, ADmiImST AnvE LAW 469 el seq. (1951). See also Nugent v. United
States, 73 Sup. Ct. 991 (1953) passim.
198. "The Loyalty Board convicts on evidence which it cannot even appraise.
The critical evidence may be the word of an unknown witness who is 'a
paragon of veracity, a knave, or the village idiot.' His name, his reputation,
his prejudices, his animosities, his trustworthiness are unknown both to the
judge and the accused. The accused has no opportunity to show that the
witness lied or was prejudicial or venal. Without knowing who her accusers
are [the accused] has no way of defending. She has nothing to offer except
her own word and the character testimony of her friends."
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 180 (1951) (Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion, commenting on Bailey v. Richardson). Also see Justice
Douglas' dissenting opinion in Nugent v. United States, supra note 197, at 998;
BARTH, THE LOYALTY OF FREE MEN 113 et seq. (1951); COUNTRYMAN, UN-AmMUcAN
Ac-ruvTis IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 286 et seq. (1950) ; Donnelly, supra note 194,
at 1094; Rauh, Informers, G-Men and Free Men, The Progressive, May, 1950, p. 9; New
Haven Evening Register, June 29, 1952, p. 1 (State Dep't apologizes to Owen Lattimore
for order barring his leaving the country based on false tip).
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The other objection that is raised on security grounds against confronta-
tion is that it will prevent ordinary citizens from giving information, because
of the resulting trouble and embarrassment for those who are required to
testify.199 This unproved assumption is a reflection on the loyalty of the
whole populace. If communist sailors do threaten our security, is it believable
that other citizens will shirk their duty to help identify them?
4. A shift in the burden of proof, from the seaman to the Government,
would signalize the conversion of the present "appeals" into proper hearings.
The original standard 2 0  should be partly restored and partly revised to re-
quire the Commandant to grant clearance unless on all the evidence and on
the record he finds that the presence of the man on board ship or on the
waterfront would be inimical to the national security. This would mean that
at the hearing affirmative evidence would have to be presented to establish
that the respondent was ineligible as charged, under one or more of the criteria
specified in the Regulations.201 Though it may not be constitutionally essential,
the presentation of the Government's case should preferably be made by
someone other than the board chairman.2 02 The Coast Guard's advocate,
however, should not cast himself in the role of a prosecutor. In other security
programs, measures have been taken to avoid an unduly adversary atmos-
phere by designating an employee to "assist" the board in the presentation
of the case.203 Whatever the success of such regulations, there is merit in
attempting to present the Government's case dispassionately. We urge this
simply because of the fact that most of the men charged do not, we iunder-
stand, have counsel.- 04
5. Contrary to the present practice, the recommended decision of the hear-
ing board and the report on which it is based should be made available to
the respondent. It would be permissible to rest the power of final decision
199. See Elder v. United States, 202 F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1953); NVEYL, Tim
BATLE AGAINST DISLOYALTY 193 (1951); Hoover, A Conment on the Article "Loyalty
Amw ng Government Employees," 58 YALa LJ. 401, 410 (1949).
200. See p. 1175 supra.
201. See, e.g., § 7(c) of the APA, 60 STAT. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1946):
"[N]o sanction shall be imposed or rule or order be issued except ... as supportcd by
and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
202. See, e.g., § 5(c) of the APA, 60 ST.T. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1946):
"No officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecut-
ing functions for any agency in any case shall, in that or a factually related case, parti-
cipate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to
section 8 except as witness or counsel in public proceedings...." See DAvIs, Awmxszs-
TRATiv LAw 417 et seq. (1951).
203. See Atomic Energy Commission, Security Clearance Procedures, 10 Cow; FED).
REGs. § 4.15(o) (Supp. 1952); Department of the Army, Civilian Personnel Loyalty-
Security Adjudications, Spec. Regs. No. 620-220-1 T22.a (1950); Department of Justice,
Sample Security Regulations under Exec. Order No. 10450 § 8(g) (April 23, 1953
draft).
204. Information informally received by authors.
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either in the hearing board or in the Commandant; but if the Commandant
continues to decide these cases we should think that some opportunity to
communicate with him must be afforded. The simplest and most effective way
to reach the Commandant is by permitting the appellant to take exceptions
to or make comments on the board's report. This is not to be taken as a
demand for formal findings of fact, by either the board or the Commandant,
or for a new hearing or oral argument before the Commandant. Due process
does not require any prescribed channels of argument and appeal °.2 0  At the
same time, it is well to keep in mind that a multiplicity of appeals does not
overcome fundamental denials of due process.
Wre are in danger of losing both ourselves and our readers in the nuances
of what is desirable, as distinct from what is required in administrative pro-
ceedings. To recapitulate the main points, what we take to be constitutionally
required is that the decision in a case of this sort must be based on a review-
able 206 record, made after detailed charges supported by substantial evidence
presented at a hearing. The skeleton of the present program can, if it is
desired, be left intact; but some of the functions must be markedly altered.
Two MAJOR POLICY ISSUES
Preoccupation with the essentials of procedural due process should not be
allowed to obscure other important aspects of the Port Security Program.
We can only raise, without resolving, a cluster of problems that gather around
two related questions: who is to set the substantive standards for clearance
of personnel, and who is to decide the cases?
Congress, of course, is the proper organ of government for initially defin-
ing the circumstances that will justify exclusion from private employment on
security grounds; this is not a matter of internal housecleaning for the execu-
tive branch. We have already granted that the delegation found in the Mag-
nuson Act is probably legally sufficient ;207 but we do not intend to defend it
as wise legislation. Even if the degree of urgency that existed in the autumn
of 1950 excused such hasty action, it is never too late to mend. Indeed, the
present Congress could with some profit direct its eager investigative eye to
205. Cf. FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949). See DAvis, AvomisTravrvE LAw 319
et seq. (1951).
206. We express no opinion about the precise form or scope of judicial review,
beyond the assumption that the courts will always find a way to correct arbitrary ad-
ministrative action. Cf. Fuchs, Administrative Determinations and Personal Rights in the
Present Sujpreme Court, 24 IND. L.J. 163 (1949) ; Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1386-1402 (1953).
The two pending cases under the Coast Guard Program represent obvious ways of
obtaining judicial review of denials of clearance. United States v. Gray, Crim. Nos.
13499-13501, W.D. Wash., 1952 (defending criminal prosecution based on refusal to com-
ply with a denial) ; Parker v. Lester,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Calif. 1953) (injunction),
207. See p. 1189 supra.
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the Port Security Program. These are some of the questions a congressional
committee might ask: is there any necessity for continuing the wide-flung
screening program at all? What has three years' experience demonstrated
about the threats of espionage and sabotage, and the most effective ways to
combat them? What criteria have been found to apply to actual cases? Has
anyone turned up, for example, who has "committed acts of treason or
sedition," or has "intentionally disclosed military information" ?0 Or
have those who have been labelled security risks incurred this doom because of
their membership in or sympathetic association with subversive organizations?
If the latter, what has been the effective dividing-line between the cleared and
the uncleared? The Commandant's belief that a man is currently a communist?
Recently? Ever? On another tack, what are the bases for extending or re-
stricting the coverage of the program? Would it not be sufficient to apply it
to certain ships on certain missions, just as it is confined to certain docks?
What wild alarm required its extension to the crews of "barges on the Great
Lakes and the western rivers" ?209
With some answers, Congress might then rationally decide whether it
wanted to continue the program, and in what form. So might the courts
reach a rational decision, if they are asked to say at what point due process
calls a halt to harsh substantive standards.
The necessity for such a decision on substance might be hastened by the
very act of requiring procedural due process. Suppose that, following such
a decision, the administrative authorities feel that they are unduly hampered.
Might they attempt to undercut the court's edict by expanding the categories
of sin? They might redraw the criteria so as to authorize inferences of in-
eligibility from conduct now considered inoffensive. Or, under the existing
criteria, the triers may begin to leap from small incidents to great conclusions.
For example, the present criteria make recent sympathetic association with a
subversive organization ground for exclusion, but a proviso permits an escape
for the suspect provided he can show "by more than a mere denial" that the
association won't jeopardize security.210 If it turns out to be inconvenient to
make a record on open evidence, a first step could be to delete the proviso,
and then make sympathetic association unequivocally disqualifying, defining
"recent," say, as any time since 1939. If this did not sufficiently tip the balance
toward the authorities, the next step would be to expand the content of the
elastic concept of "sympathetic association." To take an illustration from
the Rogers hearing described earlier,-1 ' buying a ticket in a raffle run by an
organization deemed subversive could be considered to be motivated by syrn-
pathy for the organization rather than by the hope of winning a Nash.
208. See the criteria set forth p. 1175 supra.
209. See p. 1173 supra. They might include some habitual drunkards. See Bis-
sm.L, A SanrcH ON THE RnEm (1950).
210. See p. 1176 supra.
211. See p. 1181 sutra.
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What will the Court do if it is faced with such a case? "Substantively, due
process . tolerates all reasonable measures to insure the national safety ...
[and] will always pay a high degree of deference to congressional and execu-
tive judgment .... 212 So wrote Justice Jackson in the Mezei case, with
Justices Black and Douglas not joining in that part of his dissent. If, as we
may, we put to one side the cases involving government employment, 210 only
the Taft-Hartley Oath Case 214 serves as a guide to what the Supreme Court
will consider a reasonable measure in private employment. The oath as con-
strued and upheld by a majority of the Court requires a denial of present
membership in organizations devoted to lawless overthrow of the Government.
Furthermore, an evenly divided Court sustained that portion of the oath which
demands an abjuration of belief in such means.
In the Taft-Hartley Oath Case the Court had the benefit of a debated and
deliberate congressional judgment; here Congress gave the Executive a blank
check. In the Taft-Hartley instance, the most thunderous spokesmen of organized
labor had voiced their abhorrence of the oath ;215 in the Port Security Program,
the major maritime unions (though they may someday rue it) have until now
acquiesced in this extension of Government power over their membership. If
a case reaches the Supreme Court on the substantive aspects of the Program,
the Court will be in an exposed position; and one hesitates to predict that it
will hold even the weak line that commanded a majority in the Oath Case.
On our last question-where the administrative power to decide these cases
is to lie-little of a positive nature can be said. This issue also requires knowl-
edge of further facts, such as an investigation by the Senate Committee on
Government Operations could disclose. In this part of the investigation we
should want to know more about the operation of the Coast Guard. We
should assume that the Commandant, though he accepts the responsibility
of decision, must in fact rely heavily on his subordinates. Who are they, and
what is their training? Is the "Commandant, taken either as the person incum-
bent at any time, or as the symbol for the institutionalized decision of the
Coast Guard, the proper repository of power? If the final power were to be
reposed in a board separated from the investigative and enforcement duties
of the Coast Guard, what kind of a board? Is the tripartite principle, con-
ceived as a means for resolving large conflicting interests of management and
labor, properly applied to cases involving individual adjudication? There is
a lack of detachment in persons drawn directly from the ranks of maritime
labor and management; however, the present boards may provide better repre-
sentation of the labor interest than is found on the usual "public" board.
The hypothetical congressional inquiry would unavoidably ask questions
212. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion).
213. See p. 1192 supra.
214. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
215. E.g., John L. Lewis; see N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1947, p. 28, col. 7.
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about the competence of the Coast Guard to make this kind of decision at all.
Since the investigation is not likely to occur in the immediate future, we feel
constrained to suggest some private doubts. Honorable as is the Coast Guard's
history of stalwart service, nothing in it has equipped its officers to sit in
judgment on the loyalty of private citizens. We say "loyalty" in full realization
that this is a security program. Although a disqualification on security grounds
should not necessarily carry a stigma of disloyalty, we are fairly confident
that it does, because we are confident that most of the cases concern alleged
subversive connections.
There is a real awkwardness here. If the Coast Guard has the responsi-
bility of safeguarding the ports, as it has, what outside board or official can
execute a most ticklish part of that responsibility? But at the same time,
one hesitates to leave these delicate judgments-far different from deciding
the responsibility for a collision, or the penalty for jumping ship-to men
wearing a uniform, and trained to the sea, not to the law. These doubts can
be overcome. The Coast Guard has lawyers; and one has heard practitioners
speak highly of both the military and civilian members of the Industrial
Employment Review Board.2 10 But in the end, the present authors' confidence
is shaken by one episode, perhaps trivial in itself. An attorney recently wrote
the Coast Guard requesting detailed charges on behalf of a seaman client.
He was advised in reply that, "the rules of evidence do not apply to pro-
ceedings of this nature hence specificity of charges are [sic] not necessary."
This blunder 2 17 leaves one with a shuddering suspicion that the rules of logic
do not apply either.
Comment on all these critical issues has been tentative and brief. One
excuse for this inadequacy can be advanced, and it needs to be underscored.
There are not enough facts available about the need for and operation of the
Port Security Program to support intelligent policy decisions, whether by
the Congress, the courts, or the public. Two interests are said to justify the
silence that enfolds this as well as other security programs: first, the danger
of revealing too much of our protective measures to those who would con-
found them; second, the desire to protect from needless publicity the victims
of the program. Both interests are legitimate, but both have limits which,
we think, are often exceeded. As for letting the enemy know how successful
we are in balking his knavish tricks, surely he must know already, if the
Program has been hitting the correct targets. And as for protecting the
reputation of the innocent, it can be preserved without a total blackout of the
216. This Board screened Defense Department contractors and their employees for
access to classified material. It had a civilian chairman and one military member from
each of the three services. See note 2 supra.
217. If the Coast Guard functionary had checked the appropriate Port Security Regu-
lation, 33 CODE FED. REGs. § 121.23(g) (Supp. 1952), he would have learned that "The
technical rules of evidence shall not apply" (emphasis added) ; and he might then have
perceived its familiar purport, which is to avoid rigid exclusionary rules.
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cases. One suggestion would be to enlist a group of disinterested and public-
spirited citizens to abstract and comment on a sample of cases, while con-
cealing the identity of the parties.
As things stand, a critic of these activities, which affect the lives and liveli-
hood of so many people, is left, in his search for significant facts, hunting for
the proverbial black cat in a dark room. Only on the issue of procedural
due process do we feel confident what the standards should be. As Justice
Frankfurter recently wrote, "The enemy is not yet so near the gate that we
should allow respect for traditions of fairness, which has heretofore pre-
vailed in this country, to be overborne by military exigencies.... In a country
with our moral and material strength the maintenance of fair procedures can-
not handicap our security. Every adherence to our moral professions rein-
forces our strength and therefore our security. ' '218
218. Nugent v. United States, 73 Sup. Ct. 991, 998 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
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